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In the history of our law there is no idea more cardinal than that of
seisin.
Frederick Pollock and William Maitland (1998)1
The question in this whole matter, it seems to me, is not whether
I’ve been right in what I’ve said about the purpose of the doctrine of
adverse possession, or whether I’ve made proper deductions, or
whether I haven’t missed this or that important aspect of the matter.
I’ll concede on that. The real question is whether it isn’t better to
talk in this way than to purport to solve a problem by an incantation, such as the assertion that disseisin is an intentional act.
Charles C. Callahan (1960)2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Property law scholars in the United States have discussed the doctrine of adverse possession for more than a century. Indeed, ever since
American property law scholars began to write property law treatises,
formalize property law courses in modern law schools, publish property specific articles in law reviews, and publish property law case
books, adverse possession has served as a staple of property law discourse. This Article examines how property law scholars think about
and discuss adverse possession. It explores how adverse possession
talk has changed—and not changed—over time. In other words, this
Article examines both the substance and rhetoric of property law
scholars’ attempts to explain, appraise and, at times, reform the doctrine of adverse possession.
The primary focus of this Article is adverse possession with respect
to land rather than chattels.3 A number of prominent property law
scholars have recently addressed the broad theoretical question of
1. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, VOL. 2, 29 (2d ed. 1898)
(Cambridge Univ. Press Reissue 1968).
2. CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 111 (1961).
3. For an important study of the law of chattels, see ROBIN HICKEY, PROPERTY
AND THE LAW OF FINDERS (2010).
TORY OF
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why possession itself is protected independently from ownership from
a law and economics perspective.4 This Article examines a more specific, and perhaps more concrete, subject: How property law scholars
discuss and justify the legal institution that allows a person who lacks
formal title to land or realty but who possesses or uses that land for a
specified period of time to acquire ownership or other real rights (servitudes or easements as the case may be) in that land.
This Article visualizes the history of American adverse possession
talk as taking place in a series of conversations focusing on several
distinct topics. Those conversations have unfolded across a relatively
long period of time, beginning with statements by Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Charles Langdell in the early 1880s and continuing to the
present day.5 This Article focuses on the conversations that began
largely with Holmes’ publication of The Common Law in 1881 and
continued to the early 1980s. At that time, a very different kind of
adverse possession talk, informed by law and economics scholarship
and other theoretical innovations, began to supplant the traditional
discourse.6
The conversations in this long century of adverse possession dialogue focused on several subjects and themes. First, the participants
often struggled to describe the fundamental nature of the emerging
law in the United States. Is adverse possession a specialized statute of
limitation that extinguishes the remedies of a landowner who has been
dispossessed (or disseised) of his land?7 Or is it primarily an affirmative means of acquiring ownership?8 If the former characterization is
the most apt, then the crucial determination should be when exactly
4. YUN-CHIEN CHANG, ED., LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (2015).
5. The doctrine of adverse possession was, of course, frequently addressed by
American courts, legal commentators and treatise writers before 1880. The writing of
earlier American commentators on property law, however, has exerted less influence
on how we understand adverse possession today compared to the work of Holmes
and the scholars who followed him. For instance, Kent’s Commentaries on American
Law makes only one oblique reference to adverse possession in a brief discussion of
the problem of the purchase of pretended titles. JAMES KENT, IV COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW, Lecture LXVI, 438 (1830). Washburn’s 1860 treatise on American
property law did devote a full chapter to “Title by Possession and Limitation,” EMORY WASHBURN, III, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 11763 (6th ed. 1902), but it is infrequently cited in modern academic commentary on
adverse possession. In his 1873 edition of Kent’s Commentaries, Holmes expanded the
discussion of adverse possession, but only to a limited extent. See JAMES KENT, IV
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Lecture LXVII, 446(d) (O.W. Holmes ed., 12th
ed. 1873).
6. A detailed study of the development of adverse possession discourse in the
United States from the middle of the 1980s to the present day will be the subject of a
subsequent article, though this Article will at times make reference to a number of
prominent examples of scholarship from that period.
7. Prominent advocates of this view include Ames, Fuller, Walsh and Cunningham. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.2 and IV.A.3.
8. Prominent advocates of this view include Langdell, Ballantine, Bordwell and
Helmholz. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.1 and IV.A.3.
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the dispossessed owner’s right to bring an ejectment action began to
accrue.9 If the latter description proves more accurate, and if adverse
possession really concerns the acquisition of a new or original title in
land rather than extinguishing an old title, the focus should shift to
identifying the distinctive elements of proof that a possessor or a
claimant, as the commentators began to say, must establish to justify
the new title or at least to sure up an existing but somehow defective
title.10
As the conversations deepened, the participants argued over many
doctrinal points, including the elements an adverse possession claimant must prove,11 the role of subjective intent in adverse possession
and the related problem of “pure mistake,”12 and even whether tacking should be allowed and, if so, whether privity of estate should be
required for tacking.13 It would be incorrect, however, to think that
adverse possession talk during this lengthy period was entirely
descriptive.
From the beginning, some of the key participants made claims
about the instrumental purposes that the doctrine served or should
serve. Indeed, they were aware that the doctrine could be justified on
competing grounds. Interestingly, one of the first clear taxonomies of
the rationales that could justify adverse possession emerged from English scholars, Frederick Pollock and Frederick William Maitland.14
Important American figures such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henry
Ballantine, Percy Bordwell, and Charles Callahan made important
contributions to the growing rationalization of adverse possession
law.15 That said, the general aim of the academic commentary during
this long century was to clarify the law, and where possible, to exert a
modest influence on judges as they continued to refine the doctrine of
adverse possession in practice. This first great phase of adverse possession talk came to an end with the famous debate between R.H.
Helmholz and Richard Cunningham in the first half of the 1980s.16
Throughout all of this doctrinal debate, a third important theme became apparent—a concern with the national identity of adverse possession law. Many participants—especially Ballantine, Bordwell, and
Walsh—claimed that the practice of American courts had diverged
9. This is the position advocated famously by Roger Cunningham. See infra Section IV.A.3.
10. Many scholars, including Ballantine and Hemholz, took this view. See infra
Sections II.C.1 and IV.A.3.
11. See discussion of Lon Fuller, infra Section II.C.2.
12. Almost all of the scholars discussed in this article, except Holmes, Pollock,
Langdell and Ames, address this subject at one point or another.
13. For a brief synopsis of this lively debate, see infra notes 108–10, 130, and accompanying text.
14. See discussion infra Section II.A, notes 49–64 and accompanying text.
15. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.C.1 and III.B.
16. See discussion infra Section IV.
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from what had transpired or was still transpiring in English courts as
they applied English statutes of limitation.17 In this sense, although
several prominent English voices did exert an active influence on the
development of American adverse possession discourse,18 generally
speaking, adverse possession doctrine in the United States provides a
nice illustration of the broader process of Americanizing the English
common law of property.19
A final overarching feature of adverse possession talk throughout
this long period is the degree to which the participants generally
grounded their commentary in careful observation of developments in
American courts and sought to exert a modest influence on further
jurisprudential development. Although this is not a remarkable observation, it is important nonetheless because what came next in the second great phase of adverse possession talk was a move away from
careful observation of case law and toward more generalized and prescriptive scholarship, heavily influenced by law and economics theory
but also shaped by other schools of property law theory. As I will
discuss in Parts III and IV of this Article, Charles Callahan20 and
Richard Helmholz21 played particularly important roles in disrupting
the general descriptive quality of American adverse possession scholarship and moving it in a more theoretical direction. Thomas Merrill’s
article, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession solidified that movement.22 That article adopted an approach so novel that
it marked the beginning of the second major phase of American adverse possession talk and will be discussed in the sequel to this Article.
The plan of this Article is straightforward. Part II addresses three
groups of commentators and their insights into the nature and purpose of adverse possession, including the basic question of whether
adverse possession was a fundamentally negative or affirmative doctrine and their views on the relevance of an adverse possessor’s state
of mind. Part II adopts a historical approach, focusing first on the contributions of Holmes, Pollock and Maitland, the first generation of adverse possession theorists, then reviews the contributions of Langdell
and Ames, and finally examines the American scholars whose primary
body of work was written in the interwar years between 1918 and
1940.
17. See discussion infra Sections II.C.1 and II.C.3.
18. See discussion of Pollock and Maitland, infra Section II.A.
19. For a general discussion of how American property law diverged from English
common law, especially in the 1700s and early 1800s, see STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY AND WHAT WE OWN 4–22 (2011).
20. See discussion infra Section II.B.
21. See discussion infra Section IV.
22. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse Possession, 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1122 (1985). In some sense, Merrill’s article was a bridge between the
descriptive and prescriptive approaches to adverse possession because his twin points
of departure were (1) Helmholz’s article and (2) the California Supreme Court’s decision in Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1984).
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Part III focuses on the work of post-World War II scholars William
Stoebuck and Charles Callahan and takes a particularly close look at
Callahan’s book Adverse Possession, the first extended work that
sought to reframe adverse possession through a much more skeptical
lens that resembles the approach many contemporary scholars deploy
today. Part IV analyzes the famous debate between Professor Helmholz and Professor Cunningham in the early 1980s. That part distills
the controversy into ten discrete subjects of dispute. It also demonstrates why Helmholz’s conclusions were so disturbing to Cunningham
and argues that some of the broader issues in that debate set the stage
for the future development of adverse possession discourse. Part V
concludes by reviewing the general themes that emerged during the
century-long first phase of adverse possession talk and looks forward
to divergent themes that surfaced in the following decades.
Throughout this Article, brief biographical sketches of some of the
key participants are offered, especially for those scholars whose careers may be less well-known to readers today. The purpose of these
sketches is to situate these adverse possession commentators in their
intellectual and social context.
II. THE FIRST SEVENTY YEARS: DEBATING THE NATURE
PURPOSE OF ADVERSE POSSESSION

AND

From roughly 1881 to 1952, academic debate about adverse possession law focused on several fundamental questions. Most importantly,
scholars argued about whether adverse possession was best understood as a limitation device designed to cut off ejectment claims of a
passive landowner, a positive and dynamic means of recognizing the
moral entitlement of a long-term possessor to a new title, or perhaps a
transactional tool to clear title for market participants. They also argued about several of the key elements of an adverse possession
claim, including what state of mind, if any, should be required of an
adverse possession claimant and whether privity of title should be required for tacking. Some commentators also ventured to articulate the
social, legal and institutional purposes that the doctrine served. In this
period, some commentators were true innovators; others played important roles emphasizing the divergence between American and English law and consolidating an emerging consensus view of what
American courts were or should be doing when they applied the
doctrine.
A. Holmes, Pollock and Maitland: The First Theorists
This study of adverse possession talk begins at the end of the nineteenth century with the writing of Oliver Wendell Holmes and the English legal historians Frederick Pollock and Frederick William
Maitland. These figures are important for many reasons. First, and
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most obviously, they wrote some of first canonical texts in modern
Anglo-American property law scholarship. Second, Holmes and Pollock knew each other well, exchanged letters and ideas over many decades and, no doubt, influenced one another.23 Third, these writers
were among the first modern Anglo-American scholars to carry on a
relatively high level theoretical discussion of the rationales for adverse
possession in a manner informed by the work of the German legal
science school.24 Their style, however, differed from the German
scholars they had read and their purposes were also different. Holmes
was witty yet austere, striving to identify general principles that could
explain the disorganized clutter of case law that confronted the typical
American lawyer. Pollock and Maitland had a knack for capturing the
sweep of centuries of legal development in breezy passages that highlighted themes and reduced complex doctrines into easily understood
examples. Through their literary style and because of their then novel
ideas about adverse possession, Holmes, Pollock and Maitland all exerted a major influence on subsequent generations of American property law scholars.25
Countless American property law students read and puzzle over the
passage that introduces Holmes’ chapter on “Possession” in The Common Law.26 In that chapter, Holmes seeks to answer the theoretical
question that had preoccupied the great German legal scientists of the
nineteenth century: “Why is possession protected by the law, when the
possessor is not also an owner?”27 After posing this question, Holmes
writes famously:
23. See generally MARK. D. HOWE, ED. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORREMR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932
(1961).
24. See id. at 15 (June 17, 1880 letter from Holmes to Pollock) (thanking Pollock
for a reference to Gaius and observing that it “tends to confirm a suspicion which I
have often had that even the Roman law as the Roman lawyers understood it would
give partial support to the theories of German philosophers upon possession. I was
content to assume for the purposes of my article that they were justified on their data
but I have never felt quite convinced.”). Holmes’ comment culminated an exchange
of letters about possession dating from November 1888. See id. at 8–14 (collecting
various letters). Pollock appeared to approve of the general direction of Holmes’
work, commenting on Holmes’ article on common carriers which also focused extensively on possession: “I have not had time to consider it much, but it seems alright &
at all events to dispose of the Roman law theory.” Id. at 12 (Pollock letter to Holmes,
Aug. 2, 1879).
25. The Author acknowledges that many philosophers writing in English (Locke,
Hobbes, and Hume, among others) addressed subjects associated with property theory today and that Blackstone and the Scottish Institutional Writers (Stair, Bankton,
Erskine, and David Hume) also wrote extensively about property law, but consideration of their impact on contemporary adverse possession talk will have to wait for
another day.
26. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Little Brown ed. 1881).
27. Id. at 206. For a succinct but helpful discussion of the debate between Savigny
and Jhering regarding the essential element of possession, see A.N. Yiannopoulos,
Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 525 (1991) (explaining that Savigny emphasizes the
importance of animus domini, the intent to own, in his subjective theory of possession,
SPONDENCE OF
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Kant and Hegel start from freedom. The freedom of the will, Kant
said, is the essence of man. It is an end in itself; it is that which
needs no further explanation, which is absolutely to be respected,
and which is the very end and object of all government to realize
and affirm. Possession is to be protected because a man by taking
possession of an object has brought it within the sphere of his will.
He has extended his personality into or over that object. As Hegel
would have said, possession is the objective realization of free will.
And by Kant’s postulate, the will of any individual thus manifested
is entitled to absolute respect from every other individual, and can
only be set aside by the universal will, that is, by the state, acting
through its organs, the courts.28

Many later recognized that Holmes seemed to be endorsing a personality theory of possession—the idea that possessory rights and actions (and property rights more generally) can be grounded in the
deeply rooted attachment between a person and an object under her
direct physical control or that she can control by the exertion of her
will.29
If we read further into the chapter, however, we find signs that
Holmes himself may have been skeptical of this theory. First, Holmes
immediately points out Savigny’s disagreement with Kant on this
point.30 Next, Holmes discusses Ihering’s view that “possession is
ownership on the defensive,”31 by which he appears to mean that possession is a useful proxy for ownership because the legal system relies
on it to allow apparent owners to repel claims by unlawful possessors
with minimal transaction costs.32
Finally, Holmes offers a lengthy critique of the continental civil law
distinction between possessory and petitory actions and especially the
civil law rule preventing the defendant in a possessory action from
asserting his own title in defense, a position he somehow attributes to
Kant.33 Despite these signals of his skepticism of a personality theory
whereas Jering’s objective theory stresses that the “subjective intent of the person who
has factual control over a thing is implicit in his factual authority” and therefore “any
intentional exercise of physical control over a thing is possession”).
28. Id. at 207.
29. For one of the most extensive contemporary discussions of Holmes’ “roots”
rationale for adverse possession, see Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L. J. 2419, 2455–59 (2001). See also Margaret Jane Radin,
Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 739, 741–42, 745–50 (1986) (arguing that a Hegelian “personality theory” can be used to explain adverse possession
doctrine).
30. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 207.
31. Id. at 208.
32. Id. (explaining that possession allows an apparent owner “who is exercising
ownership in fact (i.e. the possessor) [to be] freed from the necessity of proving title
against one who is an unlawful position”).
33. Id. at 208–11. Holmes was obsessed with this technical point of civil law procedure, which he claimed “follows from the Kantian doctrine.” Id. at 208. At the end of
this critique, Holmes disparages the civil law dichotomy between the possessory and
petitory action as marking “a stage or society which has long been passed” and ob-
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explanation, Holmes confuses us again with the following seemingly
throw-away (but often cited) observation at the end of the first part of
the chapter:
Law, being a practical thing, must found itself on actual forces. It is
quite enough, therefore, for the law, that man, by an instinct which
he shares with the domestic dog, and of which the seal gives a most
striking example, will not allow himself to be dispossessed, either by
force or fraud, of what he holds, without trying to get it back
again.34

Holmes seems to suggest that we protect possession to avoid dogfights, to prevent possessors from resorting to violent means of selfhelp to maintain or regain control of things they possess. But, as Pollock and Maitland soon noted, society could control the tendency to
engage in violent self-help through the imposition of criminal fines
and penalties.35 Moreover, it must be admitted that Holmes’ dog-fight
analogy does not explain why a long-term possessor is able to take
title away from a true owner in a court of law.
Although Holmes ruminates on possession for many more pages in
The Common Law, particularly with reference to movables,36 Holmes
does not attempt to identify a general rationale for adverse possession
until the very end of the book. This omission is somewhat surprising
given that his project in The Common Law was to generate a series of
general or “scientific” theories to explain patterns in case law and enable lawyers to see the underlying reasons that similar cases produced
similar results despite the often anachronistic and formalistic reasons
offered by judges.
At the end of The Common Law, Holmes returns to a highly specialized adverse possession problem—whether a possessor of a tract
of land may assert possessory rights in an easement appurtenant to
that tract against third persons before the statutory period of adverse
possession has run. But his real interest here is to show how the dominant estate is personified as a natural person, rather than in rationalizing the acquisition of a prescriptive easement.37
In 1888, Sir Frederick Pollack published his Essay on Possession in
the Common Law38 and addressed the problem of title to land and
serving that in “ninety-nine cases out a hundred, it is about as easy and cheap to prove
at least a prima facie title as it is to prove possession.” Id. at 211.
34. Id. at 213.
35. See discussion infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
36. In the rest of the chapter on “Possession,” Holmes focuses on cases involving
first possession, especially wild animals, cases involving disputes between finders and
other persons, and on whether agents or servants in possession of movables should be
recognized as having possessory rights against third persons. HOLMES, supra note 26,
at 213–35.
37. Id. at 384–85.
38. FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT S. WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN
THE COMMON LAW (Fred. B. Rothman & Co. 1985) (1888). Although Pollock and
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adverse possession in a section entitled “Title by Possession.” Pollock’s commentary covers many subjects: (1) he strongly endorses the
jus tertii principle; (2) he explains why the right to possess must be a
“transmissible right;” and (3) he accepts the view that possession is
the necessary root of title.39 In a seeming jab at his friend Holmes,
Pollock defends the separation of possessory actions from petitory actions and the postponement of the question of true title in the former,
noting “we must not be too swift to call such a state of things archaic
or anomalous.”40 Finally, although he acknowledges that modern conveyancing practices might have diminished the importance of possession as the root of title, at least as compared to the Middle Ages when
resolution of title defects without resort to possession would have led
to “intolerable complication and interminable family quarrels,”41 Pollock still asserts that even in late Victorian England, adverse possession could serve important practical purposes:
With very few exceptions, there is only one way in which an apparent owner of English land who is minded to deal with it can show
his right to so to do; and that way is to show that he and those
through whom he claims have possessed the land for a time sufficient to exclude any real probability of a superior adverse claim.42

In other words, Pollock adopts what we might regard as a familiar
utilitarian justification for adverse possession. The doctrine’s primary
purpose is to facilitate transactions, not to assuage psychological
needs or provide moral justifications for current claims of ownership.
In short, adverse possession enables current possessors who believe
they have a legitimate claim to land to enter into market transactions
relating to that land by clearing title expeditiously.
If we remain on the British side of the Atlantic a little longer, we
come across another crucial text in this initial phase of professional
adverse possession talk—Pollock and Maitland’s The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I.43 In their chapter entitled
“Seisin,”44 the authors describe how the English royal courts developed possessory actions to bring order and efficiency to disputes over
possession of land in the period from 1164 to 1272. In a sense, the
entire chapter serves as a kind of love song to one of those possessory
actions—the assize of novel disseisin—which Pollock and Maitland
Wright themselves describe the essay as a “composite,” rather than a joint work, the
sections relevant to this article were all written by Pollock and therefore he is referred
to as the author. Id. at v–vi.
39. Id. at 93.
40. Id. at 94.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 94–95.
43. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 29.
44. Recall Pollock and Maitland’s magnificent opening declaration: “In the history
of our law there is no idea more cardinal than that of seisin” and, therefore, all of
English land law is really “about seisin and its consequences.” Id.
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describe as a particularly useful summary procedure to sort out possessory rights. Although they never address statutes of limitation or
adverse possession in this chapter, their rhetorical and methodological
approach is novel.
First, the authors draw attention to the slipperiness of the language
of possession. Moving back and forth from the past to the present,
they note that “[i]n common talk, we constantly speak as though possession were much the same as ownership,”45 and illustrate the substitutability of the terms with a folksy example of a man leaving his
watch with a watchmaker. In one instant, they illustrate how seisin
had more to do with the ability to control land than the ability to
enjoy its fruits,46 but then demonstrate the ambiguity of physical control by observing a Victorian gentleman walking down the street with
an umbrella and noting all the possible legal conclusions that could be
drawn about the relationship between the man and the umbrella.47 In
these lucid, entertaining passages, Pollock and Maitland initiate a tradition that future property law scholars would eventually follow. They
looked at possession and adverse possession from a linguistic or sociological perspective, giving us a license to step back from the technicalities of legal doctrine and view possession through the eyes of a
bemused linguistic or cultural anthropologist.48
The second key contribution Pollock and Maitland made to adverse
possession discourse surfaces when they pause in their discussion of
the possessory remedies to address the dispute between “legal theorists of our own day” over why the law even protects possession, particularly when possession collides with or is protected against the
rights of the owner.49 Pollock and Maitland’s answer is strikingly modern, conceptual and cast in the language of theoretical pluralism and
historicism.50
Just like a handful of contemporary property scholars,51 Pollock and
Maitland claim that judges tend to justify the protection of possession
45. Id. at 33.
46. Id. at 34.
47. Id. at 34–35.
48. One thinks here of Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
49. POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 40.
50. “The only true answer that we are likely to get,” they write, “is that the law of
different peoples at different times has protected possession for many different reasons.” Id. at 41.
51. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 22, at 1128–33 (identifying four distinct but complimentary rationales for adverse possession: (1) a limitations rationale concerned
with overcoming stale claims and dealing with lost evidence; (2) a quieting title rationale that is focused on the administrative need to cure easily missed conveyancing
errors with a minimum of transaction costs; (3) a moralistic rationale associated with
punishing those who “sleep on their rights;” and (4) a rationale associated with vindicating the reliance interests of long-term possessors); John Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 818–27 (1994)
(identifying a doctrinally dominant limitations model, a good faith model derived
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with reference to four clusters or “types” of principles.52 First, and
perhaps with a nod to history and Holmes, they identify the maintenance of social peace and deterrence of violent acts of self-help as one
rationale.53 Pollock and Maitland immediately recognize, however,
that this justification alone is insufficient because if acts of self-help
and violence are our primary concern, society could probably deter
such behavior through criminal penalties alone.54
The second justificatory principle they observe resembles Holmes’
apparent version of will theory:
The possessor’s possession is protected, not indeed because he has
any sort of right in the thing, but because in general one cannot
disturb his possession without being guilty, or almost guilty, of some
injury to his person, some act which, if it does not amount to an
assault, still comes as dangerously near to an assault that it can be
regarded as an invasion of that sphere of peace and quiet which
should guarantee to every one of its subjects.55

The third rationale noted by Pollock and Maitland is one they associate with Ihering, namely, the idea that to protect actual owners who
have been temporarily ousted by “thieves and land-grabbers,” it is
often more practical to protect their prior possession than require
them to prove their title.56 Rejecting Holmes’ skepticism, Pollock and
Maitland argue that to require an owner to make out a “flawless title”
in every case before he could be reinstated to possession would be to
require “too much.”57 “Possession then,” for Pollock and Maitland, “is
an outwork of property.”58 To protect “rightful possessors” efficiently,
one must occasionally be ready to protect the “unjust possessor” as
well.59
Pollock and Maitland’s fourth justification is not too different from
the third. It is essentially a defense of relativity of title.60 Of course, it
from Helmholz, and a later emerging developmental model of adverse possession that
he subjects to heavy criticism); Stake, supra note 29, at 2434–55 (building on Merrill,
Sprankling, and others and identifying at least 14 different “uneasy cases” for adverse
possession before partially endorsing a “roots” or “loss aversion” rational for the
doctrine). Sprankling later constructed four distinct utilitarian models for adverse
possession in his useful treatise for law students. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 465–67 (3d ed. 2012) (identifying a limitations model, an
administrative model, a development model and an efficiency/personhood model).
52. POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 41.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 41–42 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 42.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also id. at 49 (“But the most important point for us to observe is that in
Bracton’s day this assize protects a thoroughly wrongful, untitled and vicious
possession.”).
60. Id. at 43 (“He who possesses has by the mere fact of his possession more right
in the thing than the non-possessor has; he of all men has most right in the thing until
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is true that the jus tertii principle, though a means of ordering rights
among a series of possessors, does not prove why a long-term possessor should prevail against a certain formal title holder. Yet Pollock
and Maitland claim that relativity of title was still at the core of contemporary English property law.61 Here, in their defense of relativity
of title and the need to protect even wrongful possessors against almost everyone else in the world, Pollock and Maitland link the past to
the present and cite—almost in defiance—none other than Holmes
and The Common Law,62 even though Holmes was himself skeptical
of these kinds of rationales.
Finally, one cannot help but observe how pleased Pollock and
Maitland apparently are with their taxonomy of rationales for protecting possession. They reiterate all of them several pages later in their
text,63 and then boast that, unlike the striving German monists of their
time, they are happy pluralists, content to recognize that all four justifications could work together, or at least that, in the thirteenth century, they operated “in harmonious concert.”64
Now we return to the banks of the Charles River. In his 1897 Boston University lecture that was eventually published as “The Path of
the Law,”65 Holmes embraces legal theory as the noblest calling in the
law and illustrates the importance of fundamental principles by turning at last to “statutes of limitation and the law of prescription.”66 In
an apparent allusion to Pollock and Maitland, Holmes first articulates
the lost evidence, social peace and neglectful owner rationales for adverse possession.67 But almost immediately he attempts to reveal their
collective inadequacy by describing a difficult hypothetical case: A
person accused of trespassing defends his use of the plaintiff’s land by
asserting that he has acquired a prescriptive easement by twenty years
of adverse use. The plaintiff landowner responds by charging that he
had “granted a license to a person whom he reasonably supposed to
be the defendant’s [the trespasser’s] agent, although not so in fact, and
therefore has assumed that the use of the way was permissive.”68 Has
someone has asserted and proved a greater right.”); see also id. at 77 (“Thus our law
of the thirteenth century seems to recognize in its practical working the relativity of
ownership . . . . One ownership is valid until an older is proved.”).
61. Id. at 78 (“The land law of the later middle ages is permeated by this idea of
relativity, and he would be very bold who said that it does not govern us in England at
the present day . . . .”).
62. Id. at 78 n.5 (citing, inter alia, HOLMES, supra note 26, at 215).
63. POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 44–46.
64. Id.
65. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
66. Id. at 476.
67. Id. The last two rationales were set forth by Pollock and Maitland and the lost
evidence rationale can be understood as another version of the administrative rationale for protecting possession that Pollock and Maitland also articulated. See POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra note 1, at 41–46, discussed supra note 53–62 and
accompanying text.
68. Holmes, supra note 65, at 476–77.
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the defendant—the alleged trespasser—acquired a right of way because of the objective nature of his use, Holmes asks, or has the landowner’s own subjective belief that he was granting someone—albeit
not the defendant—permission to use his land destroyed the defendant’s adverse possession claim?69
Initially, Holmes responds by pointing out that the neglectful owner
rationale cannot justify acquisition of a prescriptive easement on these
facts because the owner, by definition, has reasonably assumed he
granted a license.70 In other words, the owner is not guilty of neglect.
Yet aware that this reasoning is too simplistic, Holmes then assumes
the role of “defendant’s counsel,”71 and suggests “that the foundation
of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in the
position of the person who gains them, not in that of the loser.”72 It is
here, in rebuttal to himself, that Holmes offers his second classic articulation of the personhood rationale for adverse possession:
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long
time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and
cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no better
justification than the deepest instincts of man.73

The paradoxes do not end here, though. Holmes next justifies his personhood account by adopting the perspective of the landowner, at
least to the extent that Holmes believes the law owes him a convincing
moral justification for why he must lose some of his property. Now
Holmes suggests that it is the owner’s “neglect” that allows “the gradual dissociation between himself and what he claims,” and this disconnection between the owner’s will and object is just as important as the
“gradual association” between the possessor and the thing.74 Holmes
closes the loop, or encircles himself, by suggesting that in this hypothetical case, the owner should have been more careful. When the
owner observes that someone he presumes is a mere licensee conducts
himself as if he actually held some firmer property interest in the
69. Id. at 477.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added). Holmes’ other famous, similarly worded personhood account of adverse possession is found in his 1907 letter to William James, in which he
wrote: “[M]an, like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his
surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, can’t be displaced
without cutting at his life.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James
(Apr. 1, 1907), in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS,
LETTERS AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS, 417, 417–418 (Max. Lerner ed. 1943). See also
Stake, supra note 29, at 2456–57 (commenting on this passage and linking it to personality theory).
74. Holmes, supra note 65, at 477.
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owner’s land, it is the owner’s responsibility to investigate and, if necessary, stop the adverse user.75
Just like Pollock and Maitland, Holmes emerges then as a kind of
theoretical pluralist, at least when it comes to justifying adverse possession. In a difficult prescriptive easement case, Holmes contends a
good judge or lawyer will inevitably see the problem from both
sides—that of the possessor whose activities are gradually sinking his
being into the soil and that of the owner who at some point should
notice that the defendant is acting like a property holder himself and
must, therefore, make appropriate inquiries.
We should not forget that Holmes, Pollock, and Maitland were all
enthralled with their own language and with their ability to sow doubt
about the universality of any explanation of adverse possession. Pollock and Maitland combined their historical admiration for the assize
of novel disseisin with an uncanny modernist ability to link the past to
the present through conceptual rationalization. Holmes acknowledged
that adverse possession and prescription fill some core need in any
property system. Yet, in the end, even though today we often focus on
his articulation of a personality theory justification for these doctrines,
Holmes resisted committing to any single explanation.
B. Langdell and Ames: The Great Aphorists
Two more early movers in the debate over the fundamental nature
and purpose of adverse possession were both deans of the Harvard
Law School: the first, Christopher Columbus Langdell; the second,
James Barr Ames.76 Neither wrote extensively about adverse possession, but several of their pithy comments are still quoted frequently
today.
In his short book, A Summary of Equity Pleading, designed to accompany his casebook, Cases in Equity Pleading, Langdell addresses
the defenses available to a possessor “in an action to recover property
(especially land).”77 After reviewing the conceptual difficulties in75. Id. at 477 (“If he knows that another is doing acts which on their face show
that he is on the way toward establishing such an association, I should argue that in
justice to that other he was bound at his peril to find out whether the other was acting
under his permission, to see that he was warned, and if necessary, stopped.”).
76. For a detailed history of Langdell and Ames’ deanships at Harvard and their
impact on American legal education more generally, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOLS: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, 35–72
(1983). Langdell served as Dean from 1870 to 1895. Id. at 35–36. Ames was a student
of Langdell’s at Harvard and was appointed Assistant Professor at Harvard in 1873,
while still pursuing his graduate studies in law and, notably, without any significant
practice experience. Id. at 38. In 1895, Ames succeeded Langdell as Dean and served
in that capacity until 1909, one year before his death. Id. According to Stevens, Ames’
most important contribution was to refine Langdell’s case method for teaching law.
Id. at 51–64.
77. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING 135 (2d ed. 1883). The
first edition was published in 1877. Id. at v.
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volved in framing an adverse possession defense from the true
owner’s point of view and trying to determine when the owner’s cause
of action might have begun to accrue,78 Langdell recommends memorably that:
The thing to be looked at is the possession of the defendant, —not the
want of possession in the plaintiff. A possession which has continued
for a long time without interruption, and which has been accompanied by an uninterrupted claim of ownership, ought to prevail
against the whole world.79

Based on a review of the experience of English courts applying the
statute of limitations over the centuries,80 Langdell concludes that
“the courts came naturally and almost inevitably to regard the defendant’s possession as the important consideration; and hence out of this
statute81 has grown the doctrine of adverse possession.”82 In short,
Langdell encourages his students and readers to think about adverse
possession as a form of positive prescription,83 rather than as a device
to determine when a cause of action for ejectment had begun to accrue and when the statute of limitations on that action had run. Even
more clearly than Holmes, Langdell thus provides one of the major
rhetorical tropes that would come to dominate adverse possession talk
in subsequent decades.
Although Ames followed and entrenched Langdell’s approach to
legal education at Harvard, we tend to remember him for having
made the opposite claim about adverse possession—that in England,
at least in contrast to Continental Europe, the most important thing
was “not the merit of the possessor, but the demerit of the one out of
possession.”84 To the extent he was describing Anglo-American law,
Ames appears to be asserting a historical view of the doctrine which
requires that adverse possession be viewed in terms of the true
owner’s opportunity to bring a cause of action for ejectment and that
78. Id. at 137–38. He complained, in particular, that looking at the problem this
way meant that “the defence (sic) of the statute would always depend on an event
which had no real connection with the action.” Id. at 138.
79. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 142.
81. The statute Langdell is referring to is 32 H. VIII, ch. 2.
82. Id.
83. The Scottish Roman law scholar David Johnston traces the historical evolution
of the concept of positive prescription and distinguishes it from acquisitive prescription in Scots law in DAVID JOHNSTON, PRESCRIPTION AND LIMITATION 255–59 (1999).
For Johnston, an “accurate account of what positive prescription achieves . . . is not
that it constitutes a new title,” but rather that it “creates an irrebuttable presumption
. . . that the title on which the possessor holds is valid.” Id. at 257.
84. JAMES BARR AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL ISSUES 197 (Harv. Univ. Press 1913) (emphasis added). Ames’ two lectures addressing adverse possession were published originally as J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of
Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1889); J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L.
REV. 313 (1890). The second lecture, appearing with the subtitle “The Nature of Ownership,” is the source of Ames’ famous merit/demerit distinction. Id. at 318.
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the true owner’s failure to do so for the statutory period is what
counts.85
In truth, however, Ames may have actually been agnostic about the
entire conceptual dispute. A few sentences later he points out that,
putting aside bona fides, “there was no essential difference between
the two systems [English and Roman law]” because “[a]s a matter of
legal reasoning, the same result obtained—acquisition of a new title.”86 Indeed, the rest of Ames’ discussion of adverse possession supports the conclusion that once a statute of limitation has run not only
is the true owner prevented from exercising revendicatory rights but
the possessor’s “imperfect title must become perfect.”87
In sum, although neither Langdell nor Ames were memorable theorists of adverse possession, they were memorable aphorists. Their aphorisms about adverse possession provided useful benchmarks for
subsequent generations of property law scholars.
C. The Inter-War Years
The next group of adverse possession scholars considered in this
Article wrote primarily in the inter-war period in the United States,
when social scientists and legal realists were making a challenge to
traditional doctrinal scholarship.88 These scholars were not necessarily legal realists themselves, though they often exhibited skepticism
of formal, conceptual categories and were interested in the social consequences of legal rules.89 They were all, however, deeply learned in
English and American adverse possession doctrine. They were also
keen to Americanize and codify the law of adverse possession. They
sometimes disagreed with one another over technical issues such as
tacking,90 but they also agreed on many substantive points of law—
especially the view that a possessor’s state of mind should generally
not concern a court.91 Unlike later scholars, they were certainly not
determined to overthrow the entire institution of adverse possession.
Rather, they saw themselves as working within that system to clarify,
streamline, and rationalize the law as best they could.
85. As discussed in Sections II.C.3 and IV.A, this historical view continued to attract prominent adherents, including Walsh and Cunningham.
86. AMES, supra note 84, at 197–98.
87. Id. at 198.
88. See generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); STEVENS, supra note 76, at 131–80.
89. For a detailed critique of one account of the legal realist movement and an
alternative version emphasizing the importance of the public/private distinction, see
Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988) (reviewing Laura
Kalman, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960) (1986)).
90. See discussion infra notes 107–09, 129, and accompanying text.
91. See discussion infra notes 105–06, 119–23, 137–46, 160–65, and accompanying
text.
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1. Ballantine and Bordwell: The Transactional Perspective and the
Americanization of Adverse Possession
Henry W. Ballantine and Percy Bordwell are often linked together
in the imagination of American property law professors. A descendant of John Winthrop and the son of an Oberlin College president,
Henry Ballantine graduated from Harvard Law School in 1904 and
from there went on to become a law school dean or law professor at,
successively, the University of Montana, the University of Wisconsin,
the University of Illinois, the University of Minnesota, and finally the
University of California, where he spent most of his career becoming
the principal architect of California corporate law.92
In the early stages of his remarkable career, Ballantine published
Title by Adverse Possession in the Harvard Law Review.93 In that article, he provides what may be the best known statement of what many
scholars have come to call the “administrative” or “quieting title” rationale for adverse possession.94 Ballantine’s main idea is that adverse
possession serves not so much to promote land development, “to reward the diligent trespasser,” or even to “penalize the negligent and
dormant owner for sleeping upon his rights.”95 Rather, it functions
primarily to “quiet all titles which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct errors in
conveyancing.”96
After quoting from Langdell and Pollock,97 Ballantine zeroes in on
the sympathetic claimant he really worries about—the long-term possessor who possesses by virtue of some title.98 Ballantine is particularly
anxious about this kind of possessor when that person is either (1)
suddenly ousted by a trespasser and wants to quickly recover possession or (2) wants to enter into a transaction with a third party. In the
first situation, Ballantine muses that: “The deed under which plaintiff
acquired title, without evidence of possession by the grantor of the
premises conveyed is not even prima facie proof of title such as to
92. See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Law: Berkeley and Hastings, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA: IN MEMORIAM (Sept. 1951), http://texts.cdlib.org/view?docId=HB2290
03gf&doc.view=frames&chunk.id=div00001&toc.id [https://perma.cc/Z4VN-T2QB];
Thomas W. Dalquist, Henry W. Ballantine, 37 CAL. L. REV. 171 (1949).
93. Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135
(1918).
94. See SPRANKLING, supra note 51 at 466; Merrill, supra note 22, at 1129 (describing one set of rationales as falling under the general heading of “the interest in ‘quieting titles’ to property” and quoting Ballantine in support at n.27); Stake, supra note
29, at 2441–42 (discussing quieting title rationale).
95. Ballantine, supra note 93, at 135.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 136 (quoting LANGDELL, supra note 77, at 139). Ballantine’s quotation of
Pollock (“It is better to favor some unjust than to vex many just occupiers”) does not
contain a reference, but is likely from POLLOCK AND WRIGHT, supra note 38.
98. Ballantine, supra note 93, at 136–37.
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warrant recovery in ejectment.”99 In the second situation, which one
suspects that Ballantine considers even more grave, he notes that
“[n]or is a connected chain of deeds, which does not reach back to the
Government or to some grantor in possession, sufficient, unless it
reaches back to some common source of title, or to some source acknowledged to be genuine and valid, or unless there is some estoppel
to deny title.”100 Ballantine continues in this vein to elaborate on all of
the reasons that the “proof of a paper title sufficient to make out a
prima facie right to possession of land” can be complicated, including
questionable signatures on and delivery of deeds, difficulties in proving the legitimacy of corporate entities, and powers of attorney found
in chains of title, not to mention compliance with statutory notice and
formalities required in connection with involuntary sales, tax sales and
probate proceedings.101
Perhaps Ballantine is simply attempting to rebut Holmes’ claim in
The Common Law that “[i]n ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, it is
about as easy and cheap to prove at least a prima facie title as it is to
prove possession.”102 Or perhaps he is just speaking like someone who
had himself examined titles, or at least talked to other lawyers who
had labored in that field. Either way, it is clear that Ballantine takes
seriously the difficulties in store for a typical possessor/owner, possessing by virtue of a title, faced with the challenge of proving his title
with perfect clarity. One senses that Ballantine is beginning to think
about adverse possession in a transactional sense; that is, he views it as
a practical tool to facilitate market transactions or to reduce information and transactional costs that might otherwise impede market
transactions from occurring.103
We see this transactional view emerging in particular when Ballantine expresses concern over the problem of measuring transactional
costs in matters of title. Indeed, Ballantine asks how much effort the
legal system should demand of any possessor seeking to gain certainty
99. Id. at 136.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 136.
102. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 211.
103. See Stake, supra note 29, at 2442–44 (describing some of the law and economics literature that justifies adverse possession in terms of facilitation of market transactions, but also noting that the doctrine might increase uncertainty and thus retard
market transactions as well). As we will see, Callahan was the first property scholar to
explore this idea in a detailed way. See CALLAHAN supra note 2, discussed infra notes
220–44 and accompanying text. Before Stake, Merrill also viewed adverse possession
from this transactional perspective, focusing in particular on the reduction in transaction costs that the doctrine allows. See Merrill, supra note 22, at 1129–30 (“The institution of adverse possession is designed to reduce this drag [produced by uncertainty
in chain of titles] by extinguishing most of the older claims. In the language of takings
jurisprudence, adverse possession rests on a collective judgment that the reduction in
information and transaction costs (or insurance costs) achieved by wiping these older
claims off the books outweighs the ‘demoralization costs’ of eliminating such remote
claims.”)
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of title for a particular transaction.104 Ballantine answers his own
question by noting that due to statutes of limitations the English conveyancer only needs to find a root of title going back forty years.105 In
the United States, Ballantine implies, the conveyancer would also similarly benefit from the applicable statute of limitation, unless a “scientific system for the registration of titles” were to emerge, in which
case, he admits, “adverse possession would be of far less
importance.”106
For all the strengths of Title by Adverse Possession, it is notable that
Ballantine never addresses whether a pure trespasser, one who holds
possession without any “claim of title” whatsoever, deserves to be rewarded with prescriptive title. Although he comes close to answering
that question in another less often cited article, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession,107 even there Ballantine’s position is not crystal
clear.108 Oddly, most of Title by Adverse Possession is devoted to a
detailed attempt to rebut a claim made by Ames that when successive
possessors without formal title occupy land (or possess a chattel for
that matter), tacking of the successive periods should be permitted
even in the absence of privity of title between the possessors.109 To say
that Ballantine found Ames’ view objectionable is hardly an understatement given that Ballantine devoted pages and pages to a demonstration of just why “privity of estate” was necessary for an adverse
possessor to take advantage of tacking.110 Indeed, for Ballantine, the
tacking doctrine and the requirement of privity both served to illustrate that “the very purpose” of adverse possession is “to cure technical defects in the evidence of title.”111
104. See Ballantine, supra note 93, at 137 (“Upon every sale or mortgage of land it
is necessary that the evidence of title be critically examined. For what period and from
what source should title be deduced?”).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 43.
107. Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession, 28 YALE L.
J. 219 (1919).
108. In this second article, Ballantine stated that the basis of adverse possession is a
“claim of title or right,” see id. at 219, by which he seems to mean either some claim
based on an apparent belief that one is entitled to possess as owner or perhaps just a
claim hostile to that of the true owner. At one point, Ballantine states: “No title can
be acquired against the true owner by merely squatting on real estate.” Id. But in the
next breath, he states: “Color of title is not necessary, but the possession must evidence some claim inconsistent with that of the true owner.” Id. In other passages,
Ballantine seems to emphasize the importance of hostility to the true owner’s title as
the primary requirement for adverse possession. See id. at 219–24.
109. See AMES, supra note 84, at 205–06. Ames mustered support for this position
from a grab-bag of American and Canadian decisions, see id. at 205, n.1, and also
argued that this position was supported by his general theory of adverse possession—
namely, that the transfer of title to the possessor was justified more by the true
owner’s neglect than any merit on the part of the adverse possessor. Id. at 206.
110. See generally Ballantine, supra note 93, 147–158.
111. Id. at 151. Indeed, Ballantine notes that tacking provides an “acid test” of the
underlying theory of adverse possession because it reveals that transfer of possession
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Percy Bordwell was just as important to the development of adverse
possession discourse as his relative contemporary Henry Ballantine.
Interestingly, Bordwell is the first major American participant in the
adverse possession debate not affiliated with the Harvard Law
School.112 Born in San Francisco in 1878, three years before publication of The Common Law, Bordwell earned his undergraduate degree
and his LLB from the University of California and then came east and
earned an LLM and PhD from Columbia University, a hot bed of legal realism.113 After a four-year stint at the University of Missouri,114
Bordwell joined the faculty at the University of Iowa Law School,
where he became a much loved and respected scholar-teacher (often
referred to as “Bordy”) for the rest of his career and contributed
mightily to establishing that law school’s national reputation.115
In two important articles,116 Bordwell claims that adverse possession had become a distinctly American legal doctrine and that this
to the long-term possessor is justified, not because of the true owner’s laches, but
because of “how long the defendant by himself and his predecessors asserted a consistent claim of title.” Id. at 152. Another interesting feature of Ballantine’s lengthy discussion of tacking and the debate over whether privity was required to tack is how it
motivated him to generate vivid metaphors for the adverse possessor. At one point,
Ballantine describes the tacking adverse possessor as a gardener tending a “growing
plant, becoming more and more rooted in the soil.” Id. at 156. Later, he visualizes the
tacking adverse possessor as a kind of military figure who marches onto the field of
the true owner bearing the same flag that his predecessors have been waving and who
is therefore justified to claim a perfect title because “[t]he same flat has been kept
flying for the whole period.” Id. at 158. In these passages, we must admit, Ballantine
seems to endorse alternative justifications for adverse possession—in particular a personhood rationale and a neglectful owner rationale.
112. Cf. discussion supra note 76 (Langdell and Ames); supra note 92 (Ballantine).
Holmes entered Harvard College in 1857, graduated in 1861, and then entered the
Union Army and fought in the Civil War until 1864. G. Edward White, Introduction
to HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 26, at xi–xii. After the war, Holmes eventually returned to Harvard Law School, attended lectures for three semesters, and
was awarded a degree in 1866. Id. at xiii–xiv. His views of Harvard Law School at the
time were not flattering. Id. at xiv. Holmes later returned to Harvard Law School as a
professor for a term in the fall of 1882 before accepting his appointment to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. LIVA BAKER THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL
261–70 (Harper Collins 1991). For more on Holmes’ experience at Harvard Law
School as a student, see id. at 163–77.
113. Mason Ladd, Percy Bordwell—Teacher, Scholar, Associate and Friend, 56
IOWA. L. REV. 3, 3–5 (1970). For a discussion of the intellectual milieu of Columbia
University Law School in the 1920s, see STEVENS, supra note 76, at 137–40. Bordwell,
like Ballantine, exemplified how the Langdellian revolution in legal education spread
across the United States. Young graduates of Harvard and Columbia, like Ballantine
and Bordwell, were sent to provincial law schools in the Midwest or West with the
expectation that they would learn their craft and then return East. See SCHLEGEL,
supra note 88, at 25–27 and n.20 (listing Ballantine and Bordwell as exemplars). Of
course, these young scholars often acclimatized and never returned East.
114. See Percy Bordwell, THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA LAW LIBRARY https://library.
law.uiowa.edu/percy-bordwell [https://perma.cc/BE3Q-79Y6].
115. Ladd, supra note 113, at 3–6.
116. Percy Bordwell, Mistake and Adverse Possession, 7 IOWA. L. BULL. 129,
129–30 (1922) [hereinafter Bordwell, Mistake]; Percy Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse
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process of Americanization had led to its fundamental reorientation.
Under the old English cases dealing with disseisin, Bordwell asserts,
the focus was always on the remedial interests of the owner who was
out of possession and his loss of remedies if the statutory period had
run.117 In the United States, however, the focus shifted to the interests
of the claimant in possession in acquiring a new title based on his possession.118 In England, adverse possession and prescription was essentially “negative” in character; whereas in the United States it had
become “affirmative.”119
Although this nationalistic dichotomy does not appear especially
radical in hindsight, it would be a mistake to underestimate Bordwell’s
impact. Though he was undeniably a man at home in the American
Midwest,120 Bordwell was also remarkably learned about English law,
and this learning pervades his scholarship.121 Ironically, his vast
knowledge of English legal history was put to the service of legitimizing an American approach to adverse possession and encouraging
American judges and scholars to leave behind the obscurities of the
English law of disseisin and formulate their own native law of adverse
possession.
Several general themes emerge from Bordwell’s adverse possession
scholarship. First, Bordwell clearly favors an objective view of adverse
possession and is suspicious of any judicial attempt to justify the outcome of an adverse possession dispute in terms of the subjective intentions of the claimant. In this sense, Bordwell anticipates what became
Possession, 33 YALE L. J. 1–13, 141–158, 285–301 (1923) [hereinafter Bordwell,
Disseisin].
117. Bordwell, Mistake, supra note 116, at 129; Bordwell, Disseisin, supra note 116,
at 8–9.
118. Bordwell, Mistake, supra note 116, at 129–30; Bordwell, Disseisin, supra note
116, at 9–13.
119. Bordwell, Mistake, supra note 116, at 129, n.4.
120. Ladd recounts Bordwell’s talents as a baseball player, that he was a committed
fan of the St. Louis Cardinals, and his avid support of the University of Iowa sports
program, and especially some of its great football teams. Ladd, supra note 113, at 3–6.
Another admirer remembers that Bordwell urged the manager of the St. Louis
Cardinals, a friend of his from World War I, that the team should break from the
racial segregation of major league baseball and hire Jackie Robinson to join the team.
Charles W. Davidson, Percy Bordwell: Man of Indomitable Spirit, 56 IOWA. L. REV. 8
(1970).
121. Ironically, one of the decisive moments in this reorientation, according to
Bordwell, occurred in Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde, (1757
K.B.) 1 Burr. 60, 119, in which Mansfield had heaped so much scorn on the word
disseisin that he coined the new phrase “adverse possession” to replace it. Bordwell,
Disseisin, supra note 116, at 1. Bordwell also had many interesting things to say about
the Real Property Limitations Act of 1833, which he viewed rather critically as having
cut off what could have been a promising development of adverse possession law in
England. Bordwell, Mistake, supra note 116, at 129, n.3. Bordwell also authored numerous articles about English law both prior to and after its property law reforms. For
a complete list, see https://library.law.uiowa.edu/percy-bordwell [https://perma.cc/SA7
G-HZJK].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL101.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 23

DISSEISIN, DOUBT, AND DEBATE

22-DEC-17

12:04

23

the dominant mid-century view of adverse possession as reflected in
the American Law of Property.122 In his article on Disseisin and Adverse Possession, for example, Bordwell regrets “the vast amount of
needless litigation over the title to boundary strips long held by the
adjoining owner under a mistake as to the boundary line.”123 Although requiring a claimant to show a “deliberate intention to oust
another from his property” might have made sense in the context of a
tort action, that is, in the framework of the old English law of disseisin, he observes, “it was entirely out of place in acquisitive prescription.”124 Eventually, he argues that the proper inquiry should be on
whether the claimant “acts as owner.”125 In his article Mistake and
Adverse Possession, Bordwell also demonstrates convincingly that the
actual effect of decisions requiring a hostile intent in the boundary
context were actually quite limited because courts in those cases generally ruled in favor of the claimant relying on the alternative ground
of acquiescence whenever there was an explicit or implicit agreement
among the parties regarding the boundary line.126
The second theme to emerge in Bordwell’s scholarship is ambivalence about the “claim of title” requirement. In his article on disseisin,
he points out how the term itself evolved from referring to “claim of a
title,” that is, something close to what we mean today by “color of
title,” and came to mean “claim of right or ownership, or the intention
to acquire ownership, or to hold as owner.”127 Although he never explicitly addresses whether American adverse possession law should
adopt an express “color of title” requirement and thus limit the acquisition of title to good faith claimants, he does argue that when a claimant enters land that he thinks belongs to the government intending to
122. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 15.4, 771–85 (A. James Casner, ed. 1952).
See discussion infra Section II.C.3
123. Bordwell, Disseisin, supra note 116, at 152.
124. Id. Bordwell thus criticizes the position adopted in Preble v. Maine Cent. Ry.,
27 A. 149 (1893), that a boundary claimant must prove “a conditional intention to
oust the true owner” if a mistake as to the boundary location appears. Id. at 153. In
contrast, he asserts that both an “absolute or conditional intent to oust the old owner”
are “entirely non-essential to prescriptive acquisition,” and, in fact, both are “directly
traceable to the old disseisin and the outstanding example of how badly the attempt
to read disseisin into adverse possession works.” Id. Bordwell also praises Justice
Holmes objective approach to the problem of mistaken boundaries in Bond v.
O’Gara, 177 Mass. 139, 58 N.E. 275 (1900), calling it “so helpful that the law should
choose the intention directed towards the physical object rather than the intention to
hold in accordance with the deed.” Id. at 154. In his shorter article addressing the
problem of mistaken boundaries under Iowa law, Bordwell dwells on this theme again
and points out that the Maine rule resulted from the influence of the old English cases
concerning disseisin and confusion over the “not very happy phrase ‘claim of title.’ ”
Bordwell, Mistake, supra note 116, at 132–133.
125. Bordwell, Mistake, supra note 116, at 133.
126. Id. at 134–37. Bordwell also notes Iowa’s unique status as the only state where
courts actually imposed good faith as an element for adverse possession separate and
apart from a statutory requirement. Id. at 130 n.7.
127. Bordwell, Disseisin, supra note 116, at 153.
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acquire it under a statutory provision but then discovers that the land
is, in fact, owned by a private person, the claimant’s possession is
“much more meritorious than if he had known of the real facts.”128 In
this context at least, the seemingly good faith claimant is more deserving than a person who might be classified as “an avowed usurper.”129
Finally, though, Bordwell’s most important and constant theme was
the Americanization of the law of adverse possession. At the end of
his long article, Disseisin and Adverse Possession, he reminds his readers that “we have a doctrine of affirmative prescription and much of
the criticism of our law has resulted from failing to recognize that
fact.”130 Although he acknowledges that the negative prescription of
the English law had its “advantages in cutting off stale claims,” he
goes on, following the transactional theme announced by Ballantine,
to boast that “[o]urs is more logical from the point of view of quieting
titles.”131 Moreover, when he joins the contemporary debate over
whether privity was required for tacking, Bordwell uses the controversy to observe that while in English law tacking would appear to be
allowed in all cases, regardless of the connection between adverse possessors,132 in the United States the affirmative nature of adverse possession justifies the privity requirement and this characteristic further
reveals the doctrine’s “destiny as a true prescription.”133 Indeed, for
Bordwell, the crucial point was that “where we [Americans] have definitely rejected the old law and substituted something different and
perhaps better in its place, it would seem to be lacking in proper pride
to ignore it and go on judging the living present by the discarded
past.”134
2. Lon Fuller and Moral Agnosticism
A surprising intervention in adverse possession debates from the
inter-war period appears in the form of a short, 1928 article authored
by none other than Lon Fuller while he served as an associate profes128. Id. at 155.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 301.
131. Id.
132. Bordwell elaborates at length on that view, noting that in early English law
under the statutes of Henry VII and James I, no connection at all between successive
possessors was required for the applicable statute to run and that under the English
Real Property Limitations Act of 1833, the rule was more or less to the same effect.
Id. at 5–6.
133. Id. at 9. As Bordwell explains, if, as in the United States, adverse possession
was really positive, then the crucial question became “whether a new title has come
into being,” id. at 12, and thus successive adverse possessors should be required to
“hold under the same claim” and show that rights acquired by one possessor had
passed to the successor by privity of estate. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at 301.
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sor at the University of Oregon.135 On its face, Fuller’s article looks
like nothing more than a case note analyzing a 1928 Oregon Supreme
Court decision.136 Yet it also represents an incisive invitation to rethink the law of adverse possession from the ground up and may have
partially inspired one of the most frequently cited contemporary articles on adverse possession.137
Fuller begins by rejecting the traditional adverse possession formula
with five or six elements and suggests instead that the elements could
be reduced to three:
(1) Possession must be entered into and maintained for the statutory period. (2) The possession must operate to give the owner of
the land a cause of action. (3) The possession must be “unaccompanied by any recognition, express or inferable from the circumstances, of the right” of the owner.138

Here, Fuller essentially calls for a radical simplification of adversepossession law, grounded in the view that the fundamental question
was, as William Walsh would argue a decade later,139 whether a claimant had done something to warrant the true owner having a cause of
action in ejectment against him.
With this new framework in place, Fuller then turns to the problem
of mistaken-boundary cases, of which the noted case was an exemplar,
and focuses on his proposed third element—possession must not be
permissive or, as most courts then put it, “hostile and under a claim of
right.”140 Fuller’s key insight is recognizing that there are really two
different classes of mistaken boundary cases: (1) “conscious-doubt”
cases, i.e., those in which “a landowner encroaches on the land of his
neighbor when he is consciously doubtful as to the location of his
boundary”; and (2) “pure-mistake” cases, i.e., “those where a landowner encroaches on the land of his neighbor through a mistake as to
the extent of his own boundaries, under circumstances which show
that the possibility of error was not in his mind.”141 Seventy years
later, Lee Fennell identified these two categories as the basis for her

135. Lon L. Fuller, Adverse Possession—Occupancy of Another’s Land Under Mistake as to Location of a Boundary, 7 ORE. L. REV. 329 (1928).
136. See Heyting v. Bottaglia, 123 Or. 517 (Or. 1928).
137. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse
Possession, 100 N.W. U. L. REV. 1037, 1051 (2006) (citing Fuller, supra note 135).
138. Fuller, supra note 135, at 329–30. Fuller explains in detail why the traditional
statement that possession must be (1) hostile or under a claim of right, (2) actual, (3)
open and notorious, (4) exclusive, and (5) continuous does not make sense and how
these elements are encapsulated in his simpler, integrated approach. Id. at 330. n.4.
139. William F. Walsh, Title by Adverse Possession, 16 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 532, 547
(1939), discussed infra Section II.C.3.
140. Fuller, supra note 135, at 331.
141. Id.
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own proposal to reorganize adverse possession doctrine around a requirement of bad faith.142
Within the first category—conscious-doubt cases—Fuller acknowledges that it might make some sense for courts to explore an encroacher’s intentions because sometimes the encroacher might only
set up a “provisional or tentative barrier” with the full understanding
that if he and the other party are mistaken about the boundary location, the boundary would be moved later on.143 In other cases, though,
he admits that the encroacher might set up a barrier that is more permanent, reflecting a more definite intention to claim the fenced land
as his own, thus satisfying the claim-of-right requirement.144 But
Fuller’s real concern is with cases of pure-mistake, which he claims are
far more common and constitute the “normal case.”145
After reviewing the somewhat confusing evolution of Oregon case
law, Fuller finally recommends that the Oregon Supreme Court abrogate any distinction between conscious-doubt and pure-mistake. He
advises that the court should adopt an approach in which an encroacher’s intent is “derived directly from the physical senses,” which
would mean that an encroachers “intent to claim the land actually occupied,” would effectively be inferred and would override “the less
immediately effective intent to hold in conformity with the deed.”146
In other words, Fuller hopes to steer courts away from distinguishing
between conditional or unconditional intent and thus avoid outcomes
contingent on pure supposition and hypotheses.147 Fuller notes an additional benefit of this approach would be elimination of any incentive
for well-coached possessors to alter their testimony to fit a court’s preferred characterization of the necessary state of mind of a possessor.148 In the end, although Fuller does not call for a rule that would
reward only bad-faith adverse possessors with a title, he is clearly
moving in a direction that would remove moral intuitions from adverse possession law, a position that attracted scholarly support from
142. Fennell, supra note 137, at 1051–52, n.66, 69 (citing Fuller in support of her
taxonomy of adverse possessors). While Fennell’s proposal was, no doubt, inspired by
other scholars of adverse possession, Fuller may have been a crucial inspiration to her
search for a more sophisticated taxonomy and theory of adverse possession.
143. Fuller, supra note 135, at 331. Fuller also acknowledges that an inquiry into
the intent of the possessor could be appropriate when “it appears that the possessor
was aware of the possibility that he might be intruding upon his neighbor’s land,” for
example, where a boundary had not been surveyed and both parties were in doubt
about the boundary line—but some other exigency led the eventual claimant to erect
some temporary barrier. Id. at 338, 332 (discussing Hickey v. Daniel, 99 Or. 525, 195
Pac. 812 (1921)).
144. Id. at 331–32.
145. Id. at 333.
146. Id. at 336.
147. In any case in which the encroacher was unaware of the possibility of error,
Fuller advised, courts should avoid inquiry into his actual intent and presume that
possession was held “under a claim of right.” Fuller, supra note 135, at 338.
148. Id. at 336–37.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL101.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 27

22-DEC-17

DISSEISIN, DOUBT, AND DEBATE

12:04

27

other scholars in his own day,149 and eventually from some contemporary property law scholars like Fennell who adopted the rule decades
later in even more ingenious forms.150
3. William Walsh and the American Law of Property
William Walsh’s contribution to what became the mid-twentieth
century American consensus view of adverse possession is probably
less well known than that of either Ballantine, Bordwell or even
Fuller, but is no less important. Walsh was a professor at the New
York University Law School. He was a legal historian and authored a
lucid one volume History of Anglo-American Law that told the story
of the development of English property law from the Anglo-Saxon
period through the period of the American colonies.151 Walsh’s crucial
role in our story derives from his article published in the New York
University Law Quarterly that made several important claims about
the nature and purpose of adverse possession and several of its key
elements.152 Walsh’s article, in turn, formed the basis for much of what
eventually became the chapter on adverse possession in the American
Law of Property, published a dozen years later, in 1952, under the
supervision of James Casner.153
149. In a short 1932 article, William Sternberg essentially argues, just like Fuller,
that in mistaken boundary cases, a possessor’s intentions should be irrelevant. William
Sternberg, The Element of Hostility in Adverse Possession, 6 TEMP. L. Q. 207, 212–20
(1932). Reviewing what he calls the “four principal views” regarding the hostility element, id. at 213, Sternberg clearly favors the “so-called Connecticut rule,” according
to which, “hostility in adverse possession consists merely in the intent to claim as
owner” and “it makes no difference whether such claim is made with intent to assert a
rightful or wrongful ownership,” id. at 214 (citing French v. Pierce, 8 Conn. 439
(1831)), and disapproves an approach that would require courts to find a “technical
disseisin.” Id. at 215. Although Sternberg cites a number of law review articles, he
gives Fuller particular credit for stating “the fundamental objection” to a rule which
requires courts to parse the subtleties of claimants’ intentions in boundary disputes.
Id. at 217 (citing Fuller, supra note 135).
150. See Fennell, supra note 137, at 1048–49 (positioning her argument for a bad
faith requirement in adverse possession as a “significant departure” from modern
scholarly approaches which she contends tend to disfavor bad faith claimants).
151. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1932).
Walsh’s book was not an original work of scholarship. Instead, it synthesized the work
of Pollock, Maitland, Holdsworth, Ames and others in clear, direct prose and with an
unmistakable tone of authority.
152. Walsh, supra note 139, at 539.
153. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 122, § 15.1, at 755 (explaining
that preparation of the chapter on adverse possession was originally assigned to
Walsh, noting that prior to his death Walsh asked Rutherford G. Patton to take over
the project for him and suggested use of his material from the N.Y.U. Law Quarterly
Review, and acknowledging that work’s “excellence” and “incorporation into the present manuscript”). Although Casner acknowledged Patton as the author responsible
for the chapter on adverse possession in the American Law on Property, id. at v.,
Patton drew on Walsh’s treatise, W. WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY, ch. 3 (1947), which, in turn, was based largely on Walsh’s N.Y.U. Law Quarterly
Review article. Patton, as noted above, acknowledged his heavy borrowing from
Walsh’s article. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 122, at 755. All of this was
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Walsh possessed an admirable ability to synthesize a great deal of
legal history while drawing clear lessons that he cast in the language of
“legal theory.”154 He was also able to draw on the work of other contemporary scholars, including a useful article authored by William Edwin Taylor, which collected all the existing statutory provisions in the
United States addressing adverse possession at that time.155 On some
subjects, Walsh’s work is cumulative and cautious. For example, when
identifying the fundamental purpose of adverse possession, Walsh
tends to split the baby—giving more or less equal credit to the notion
that the doctrine’s purpose is to quiet titles for those already in possession and to the idea that it penalizes the slothful owner who allows
his remedies to lapse, with perhaps a modest tilt in favor of the
former.156
For Walsh, the only “true approach” to understanding adverse possession is a “historical one.”157 Thus, much like Pollock, he returns
time and again to the principle of relativity of title,158 and, like Pollock
and Maitland, believes that the key historical breakthrough in English
common law was the development of the assize of novel disseisin,
which allowed a current possessor, even a wrongful one, to protect his
possession effectively against any subsequent disseisor and against all
the world except the true owner.159 Walsh continues in this vein by
explaining that the statutes of limitation that developed later in English law not only barred the real owner’s right to recover and extinguish his title,160 but also rendered the wrongful possessor’s title
“absolute.”161 Walsh did not characterize this phenomenon as resulting in a transfer of title, but rather as creating a “new title.”162
Perhaps Walsh’s most important contribution, though, relates to his
role in forming the dominant hornbook view that courts should not
base the outcome of an adverse-possession claim on the claimant’s
state of mind. Walsh’s key move is to examine the problem from the
point of view of a true owner who seeks to bring an action in ejectment against a wrongful possessor or, for that matter, from the point
noted in Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to
Professor Helmholz, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 2–3, n.7 (1986) [hereinafter Cunningham,
Reply].
154. Walsh, supra note 139, at 540.
155. William Edwin Taylor, Titles to Land by Adverse Possession (pts. 1 & 2), 20
IOWA L. REV. 551, 738 (1935). Taylor also published another article addressing “the
element of actuality” in adverse possession about the same time that Walsh published
his article. William Edwin Taylor, Actual Possession in Adverse Possession, 25 IOWA
L. REV. 78, 79 (1939).
156. Walsh, supra note 139, at 535–36.
157. Id. at 536.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 537.
162. Id.
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of view of a wrongful possessor, who has himself been dispossessed by
a subsequent adverse possessor and wants to recover possession
through ejectment. Walsh asks whether the defendant in those actions
can defeat a timely ejectment suit by “introducing evidence that he so
occupied without intent to claim a title superior to that of the plaintiff,
or that he had in conversations with third persons admitted the superiority of the plaintiff’s title.”163 Walsh’s answer—in the negative—is
stated with a powerful, almost irresistible logic, sweeping seven hundred years of legal history into a single paragraph:
There is, of course, no doubt at all that such evidence would be
excluded. A claim of title on his part is not essential to the maintenance of ejectment against him. Even positive affirmative evidence
that he at all times admitted that he occupied the premises without
right or title, in the absence of proof that he occupied as licensee or
tenant of the true owner or of notice of such statements to the true
owner, would not make him any the less a trespasser and disseisor,
liable to a suit in ejectment and the usual action for mesne profits
either following that action or in connection with it. It necessarily
follows that the statute runs against the owner’s right of action in
ejectment from the time the wrongdoer took possession irrespective
of his mental attitude. Every wrongdoer entering without right
knows this fact. That is the typical case of the usual disseisor whose
possessory title has been protected by possessory assizes, writs of
entry and ejectment from 1166 down to the present day.164

Let us give Walsh his due. In just a few memorable sentences, he
makes a compelling, logical case for the black letter rule that a “claim
of right” forms no part of the common law of adverse possession,
other than to mean that an adverse possessor cannot be holding with
the permission of the owner. Nothing more; nothing less. It is no wonder that James Casner permitted this entire passage,165 along with almost all of the other salient parts of Walsh’s article,166 to be inserted
wholesale into the American Law of Property, and thus form the
background for one of the greatest debates in American property law
163. Id. at 538.
164. Id. at 537.
165. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 122, § 15.2, at 762.
166. In another lengthy section of his article, titled “Hostility of the Possession and
Claim of Title,” which also was repurposed wholesale for American Law of Property,
Walsh argues once again that, if courts were to ask the proper question—“whether
the true owner had a right of action in ejectment against the wrongful possessor continuing without interruption for the statutory period,” Walsh, supra note 139, at 547,
they would certainly dispense with inquiries into the state of mind of the possessor
because, of course, a true owner has a legitimate claim for ejectment regardless of
whether the possessor is claiming under a title or not. Id. at 547–55. To appreciate the
debt owed by American Law of Property to Walsh, compare Walsh’s other powerful
statement about subjective intent in his article, Walsh, supra note 139, at 550, with
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 122, at 776–77. Even Walsh’s long footnote
49, at page 550, citing dozens of cases, is repeated largely verbatim in American Law
of Property. Id. at 777–78, n.30.
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scholarship.167 In many ways, this statement represents the proud capstone to the painstaking labor of several generations of preceding
American property law scholars. If we appreciate the years of scholarship and reflection that laid the foundation for this statement, perhaps
we can better appreciate the surprise that a scholar like Roger Cunningham would have experienced on reading Professor Helmholz’s
1983 article, which seemed to toss aside far too casually Walsh’s insights and learning.168
One other aspect of Walsh’s article is noteworthy. Walsh appears to
be one of the first scholars to focus extensively on the nature of the
physical possession sufficient to support a claim of adverse possession.
Thus, in another section of his article that reappeared in American
Law of Property,169 Walsh observed that the kind of possession required for a successful adverse-possession claim is nothing more than
“the degree of actual use and enjoyment of the parcel of land involved
which the average owner would exercise over similar property under
like circumstances.”170 Consequently, while continuous residence,
construction of improvements, or cultivation of agricultural fields
would normally be ample evidence of actual possession, these acts are
not actually essential. Moreover, living on the land is not even required where “other acts of dominion regularly exercised establish unbroken possession in fact for the required period.”171 In a passage that
would eventually haunt a contemporary scholar like John
Sprankling,172 Walsh writes:
Wild, undeveloped lands so situated and of such character that they
cannot be readily improved, cultivated or resided upon involve a
very different degree of control evidenced by much less actual exercise of ownership by affirmative acts to establish possession, since
the usual acts of ownership by making improvements, cultivation of
the soil and residing on it are impossible or unreasonable.173

In essence, Walsh supports a sliding-scale or “average owner” approach to the actual possession element.174 Although “occasional trespasses” are insufficient, other more consistent activities, even if

167. See discussion of the Helmholz-Cunningham debate infra Section IV.
168. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
169. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 122, at §15.3 at 765.
170. Walsh, supra note 139, at 542 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 543.
172. Sprankling points out that this “average owner” approach to actual possession
has roots in nineteenth century American case law, but he also laments its de facto
national codification in the American Law of Property. John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 835 n.79 (1994).
173. Walsh, supra note 139, at 543; see also AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 122, at §15.3 at 766–67.
174. Walsh, supra note 139, at 544.
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separated by “considerable intervals,” can suffice if the “average
owner” test was met.175
In sum, Walsh did not theorize any dramatic new ways to understand adverse possession. But he helped crystalize core aspects of the
doctrine in a particularly memorable way. Moreover, by linking the
pure possession or objective approach to adverse possession with a
conceptual framework focused on the accrual of a cause of action for
ejectment, Walsh helped establish the key doctrinal background for
subsequent debates.
Looking back at this entire first period of adverse possession talk,
stretching from Holmes’s writings in The Common Law to William
Walsh’s scholarship that formed the foundation of the influential, midtwentieth century monument, American Law of Property, we see both
continuity and some gradual evolution. The continuity emerges in the
recurring debate over whether to frame adverse possession fundamentally as a limitation device, which courts use mechanistically by simply
identifying the moment in time when a landowner’s cause of action for
ejectment begins to accrue, or as an affirmative, positive means of acquiring a new title. Pollock, Maitland, Ames and Walsh all, in one
form or another, advocated for the negative, limitations model;
Holmes, Langdell, Ballantine and Bordwell argued for the affirmative
model that tended to view adverse possession from the perspective of
the claimant proving his right to a new title and from the institutional
perspective that the marketplace needed a practical doctrine to quiet
titles in order to facilitate real estate transfers. Continuity and evolution appear in the increasingly dominant call for an objective approach to a claimant’s state of mind as advocated by Bordwell, Fuller
and Walsh. Interestingly, Holmes, Pollock and Maitland, and to a
somewhat lesser extent, Ballantine and Bordwell all made claims
about the functional purpose of the doctrine; but as the period concluded, most scholars tended to focus more on the contours and details of the doctrine’s application rather than the ends it served. In the
period that followed the publication of American Law of Property, the
pace of intellectual change increased, with more strident calls for an
objective approach to an adverse possessor’s state of mind and with
some scholars beginning to question whether the doctrine itself should
survive in a modern, increasingly technologically sophisticated age.

175. Id. Walsh was also skeptical that the elements of “open and notorious” possession had any independent meaning other than being a way of signaling “possession in
fact” or what he called “legal possession.” Id. at 545. Walsh admitted that “furtive,
hidden, concealed use of the property at odd times” is not typical of the “average
owner,” but he also questioned judicial statements linking the “open and notorious”
elements to the “purpose of giving the owner notice of the adverse claim” because
they do not seem to have any “apparent relevancy or effect in the actual decisions of
these cases.” Id. at 546.
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III. THE NEW CRITICS
The next generation of property scholars who wrote about adverse
possession published their work in the lengthy post-war period between 1952, which saw the publication of American Law of Property,
and 1983, when Richard Helmholz published his famous study of the
impact of subjective intent on the outcome of adverse-possession
cases. During this period, fewer pieces of memorable adverse-possession scholarship were published than in earlier decades, but several
scholars’ efforts still deserve study. The scholars working in this period can usefully be viewed together as legal New Critics, that is, as
law school cousins of the mid-twentieth century, American school of
literary scholarship known as The New Criticism.176 An examination
of these scholars’ work—especially two of the most prominent scholars in this period, William Stoebuck and Charles Callahan—reveals a
rigorous attention to linguistic detail, an almost aesthetic objection to
the inelegance of adverse-possession doctrine, a certain bemused detachment, and finally—especially in Callahan—an impulse to subject
adverse-possession law to an institutional critique that presaged a law
and economics analysis.
A. William Stoebuck, Ironic Skepticism and the State-Specific
Study Approach
A number of articles that appeared in this era attempted to analyze
adverse possession case law and statutes of a particular state.177 Perhaps the best known, and certainly the most frequently cited example
of this genre, is a 1960 article authored by William B. Stoebuck focusing on developments in the State of Washington.178 Although
Stoebuck wrote the article while he was still a practicing lawyer in
Washington, he went on to become an influential property scholar and
co-authored, along with Dale Whitman and Roger Cunningham, one
of the most widely used hornbooks on property law in the United
States.179 In fact, Stoebuck’s article shared many features with the
176. For a critical evaluation of the school of literary criticism, which flourished in
American universities in the period from the late 1930s to the 1950s and which was
known as “American New Criticism,” see TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY:
AN INTRODUCTION 45–51 (2d ed. 1983).
177. See R.D. Cox, Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title, 11 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 1 (1980); R.D. Cox, History of the Adverse Possession Statutes of Tennessee, 6 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 673 (1976); Steadman, The Statutory Elements of Hawaii’s
Adverse Possession Law, 14 HAW. B.J. 67 (1968); Williams, Title by Adverse Possession in Indiana, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 27 (1971).
178. William B. Stoebuck, The Law of Adverse Possession in Washington, 35
WASH. L. REV. 53, 54 (1960).
179. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE
LAW OF PROPERTY (1984).
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chapter that later appeared in the Cunningham-Stoebuck-Whitman
hornbook.180
In many ways, Stoebuck’s article is representative of the dominant
view of adverse possession discourse in mid-century American legal
thought. Although certainly aware of the doctrine’s competing public
policy justifications, Stoebuck strikes an agnostic position as to which
justification is most convincing.181 Rather than reveal either a clear
moral or functional view of the doctrine, his tone is instead one of
ironic mystification at the doctrine’s persistence.182
Stoebuck’s task in analyzing adverse possession in Washington was
simplified by the then-existing statutory framework, which was relatively clear.183 Focusing on the adverse-possession claimant’s requisite
intent, Stoebuck pictures Washington case law as illustrating the majority approach in the United States; that is to say, to prove possession
is “hostile,” a claimant need only show that her possession is neither
subservient to the owner nor permissive.184 Decisions stating that possession be under a “claim of right” did not, in Stoebuck’s view, demand anything more than was required by the element of “hostility;”
they merely required acts of possession that are consistent with those
of a true owner or that would be objectionable by an actual owner of
land.185
To explain why some courts characterize mere “squatters” as not
satisfying the “claim of right” element, Stoebuck visualizes these people as residing in temporary dwellings (a “shack”) on the “periphery
of undeveloped land . . . .”186 Because they fail to make any “extensive
use” of the land and their presence is otherwise unobtrusive and
ephemeral, courts presume that squatters possess the land with the
permission of the owner.187 In other words, squatters’ lack of good
faith does not disqualify them from establishing adverse possession;
180. The section on adverse possession in the hornbook is relatively short, but a
number of specific sentences and phrases appear to have been taken directly from
Stoebuck’s 1960 article, suggesting that Stoebuck may have taken the lead in preparing the section. Compare Stoebuck, supra note 178, at 73 (“Hostility is the very marrow of adverse possession”), with CUNNINGHAM, supra note 179, § 11.7, at 766
(“Hostility is the very marrow of adverse possession”).
181. Stoebuck, supra note 178, at 53.
182. Id. (noting that adverse possession is “an anomaly in the law” because “a legal
right is obtained through conduct which must be wrongful” and commenting that
“[c]learly such a strange and drastic doctrine must spring from strong necessity”).
183. Washington provided a general ten-year statute of limitations for all actions
for the recovery of real property and a seven-year statute of limitations that ran in
favor of an adverse possessor who had possessed under color of title, who paid all
property taxes during that time-period, and who believed in good faith that he has
title. Stoebuck, supra note 178, at 54–55 (discussing RCW 4.16.020, the ten-year statute, and RCW 7.28.070, the seven-year color-of-title statute).
184. Stoebuck, supra note 178, at 73.
185. Id. at 73–74.
186. Id. at 74–75.
187. Id.
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instead, the uncertainty and marginality of their actual possession
makes them unworthy of title.
Addressing “subjective intent” generally, Stoebuck recognizes the
confused state of the law,188 and clearly would prefer for the issue to
be banished from adverse possession doctrine altogether.189 At one
point he throws up his hands and admits quite candidly that the law
“is a jungle so tangled and matted that, not only do litigants enter and
never emerge, but also this article, while it must emerge, cannot say
where it has been.”190 Finally, after noting that most states and England had eliminated inquiries into either negative or affirmative intent, Stoebuck calls on the Washington Supreme Court to eliminate it
as well, observing humorously that “since a man cannot by thoughts
alone put himself in adverse possession, why should he be able to
think himself out of it?”191 In general, as he calls on courts to streamline and simplify the law of adverse possession, particularly regarding
intent, Stoebuck maintains his position of ironic detachment, perhaps
also sowing seeds of doubt as to the continuing utility of the entire
institution of adverse possession.
First published in 1984, the Cunningham-Stoebuck-Whitman hornbook, The Law of Property,192 generally adopts a view of adverse possession similar to the one Stoebuck advocated in his article. The
authors clearly favor the objective approach to the question of hostility and claim of right.193 They profess agnosticism toward the justifications for the “ ‘strange and wonderful’ doctrine of adverse
possession,”194 only hinting vaguely that the objective of inspiring
owners to look after their property might be better served through
some less drastic means. Yet when it comes to stabilizing boundaries,
quieting titles, protecting the reliance interests of third parties, and
promoting the productive use of land, they conclude that “[i]f we had
188. Id. at 76 (labeling this “the most troublesome problem in all of adverse
possession”).
189. See id. at 76–78.
190. Id. at 78.
191. Id. at 80. Stoebuck’s discussion of mistaken boundary cases, which he distinguishes from cases involving “subjective intent,” is rather low key. Although he accepts the theory’s underlying rulings that there is no adverse possession when there
has been evidence of a conditional agreement between neighbors to set up a temporary boundary until the true line can be determined at a later date, he acknowledges
that courts could mistakenly find an agreement on “nebulous facts.” Id. at 75, 80. He
also claims, though, that he could cite thirty mistaken-boundary cases for the proposition that if other elements of adverse possession are present, “a mistake as to the true
ownership will not prevent adverse possession.” Id. at 80.
192. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 179.
193. Id. § 11.7, at 762. More affirmatively, the authors state: “It is the view here,
along with that of most decisions and of nearly all scholars, that what the possessor
believes or intends should have nothing to do with it.” Id. § 11.7, at 761.
194. Id. § 11.7, at 764.
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no doctrine of adverse possession, we should have to invent something
very like it.”195
Finally, although Stoebuck and his co-authors acknowledge that title derived from adverse possession is a “new chain of title” and thus
“provides a rare instance in which original title may arise in a mature
society,”196 it is noteworthy that they do not place their treatment of
the subject at the beginning of their book as many contemporary
property scholars do today. Instead, they nestle it deep in Chapter 11
on Conveyances and Titles, amid lengthy discussions of deeds, escrows, boundaries, the recording system, curative and marketable title
acts, title covenants, title insurance and title registration, among other
subjects.197 Seen in this context, adverse possession appears not as a
powerful instrument of social policy or a reflection of the very soul of
property, but rather a handy tool in the real estate practitioner’s tool
kit. In this sense, Stoebuck and his co-authors link themselves to the
inter-war scholars, Ballantine and Bordwell, who early on began to
advocate for a transactional approach to adverse possession
doctrine.198
B. Charles Callahan and High New Criticism
In March 1960, the same year William Stoebuck published his article on adverse possession in Washington, Charles Callahan gave three
lectures at the Ohio State University College of Law. The following
year, these lectures were published in a short book titled Adverse Possession.199 Callahan’s book represents perhaps the most skeptical writing about adverse possession that had yet appeared in the United
States. It also anticipates many themes of the even more highly critical
adverse possession discourse that would bubble up in American legal
scholarship beginning in the 1980s.
Callahan himself is an enigmatic figure. After earning a J.D. from
the Ohio State University in 1934,200 and then spending a year in private practice, Callahan went east to the Yale Law School where he
eventually earned an S.J.D. in 1937 and served as an assistant professor in 1939. In 1943, he returned to Ohio State and became an associate professor, and later full professor. He gave his lectures on adverse
possession while serving in that capacity. Callahan’s research interests
were diverse. He notably co-authored a lengthy chapter on Powers of
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id. at 758.
See id. §§ 11.1–11.15.
See discussion supra Section II.C.1.
CALLAHAN, supra note 2.
Id. at viii.
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Appointment with W. Barton Leach in the American Law of
Property.201
While working on his S.J.D. at Yale, Callahan served as an assistant
to Underhill Moore, one of the most controversial legal realists of his
age.202 He worked on Moore’s curious studies of parking offenses in
New Haven—one of the first attempts at full blown empirical research
in the American legal academy—and eventually co-authored with
Moore a lengthy, almost unreadable law review article reporting on
those findings.203 Although it would be difficult to determine exactly
what Callahan took away from his work with Moore, it is safe to assume that he at least absorbed some of the anti-formalism and socialscience skepticism of Moore and the other legal realists still working
at Yale at the time.204
Turning to Adverse Possession, we can sense the historical and satirical ambition of Callahan’s lectures from the very first sentence: “In
1952, halfway between the explosion of the first atomic bomb and the
first successful potshot at the moon, the Court of Appeals of New
York decided a case entitled Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz.”205 As this
illustrates, Callahan’s goal was to explore why, in an age of stunning
scientific accomplishments, courts could still be so muddled when
called upon to apply the doctrine of adverse possession. His method is
partly historical and partly impressionistic. He seeks to raise questions
and provide tentative answers, but does not appear particularly dogmatic. His general message is that adverse possession is, in the very
long run, likely to become an anachronism of property law as land
transactions are subjected to ever more scientific and reliable procedures. Despite this skeptical view of the institution’s long-term viability, Callahan does not call for the doctrine’s immediate abolition,
recognizing that it still serves some useful social and transactional
purposes.
Callahan’s first lecture, i.e., the book’s first chapter, is devoted to
“Property, Policy and Possession.” Callahan begins by telling the well201. See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, Part 23, 457–657 (A. James Casner, ed.,
1952).
202. SCHLEGEL, supra note 88, at 131–36.
203. Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan, Law and Learning Theory: A Study
in Legal Control, 53 YALE L. J. 1 (1943); SCHLEGEL, supra note 88, at 131. According
to Schlegel, Callahan was not Moore’s ideal choice as a research assistant because
Callahan had no training as a professional social scientist and was more interested in
procedure. Id. Callahan, in turn, was not particularly enthusiastic about Moore’s parking studies and never did any empirical research of his own after leaving Yale. Id. at
325, n.225.
204. For detailed consideration of the attempt to marry the social sciences with
American legal education and scholarship, see generally SCHLEGEL, supra note 88,
and especially 115–146 for an evaluation of Underhill Moore. For a more condensed
appraisal of the attempt to integrate law and the social sciences, see STEVENS, supra
note 76, at 131–54.
205. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 1.
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known story of the Lutz case and concludes, like so-many critics in the
years that followed, that the court of appeals decision erred in making
too much hinge on the claimant’s state of mind:
Prowling around in Lutz’s head produced a result which, superficially at least, is remarkable. Lutz was not an adverse possessor with
respect to Charlie’s shack because he knew it was on someone else’s
land. He was not an adverse possessor with respect to the garage
because he thought it was on his own land.206

After this disparaging opening, Callahan positions the doctrine of adverse-possession in the broader spectrum of law, noting that it was less
popular and dynamic than some areas like international law, administrative law and tax law,207 and, as a part of the wider fabric of property
law, was likely to shrink and consolidate through the welcome
processes of legal rationalization and law reform.208
Toward the end of this initial chapter, Callahan turns to the question of why we protect possession apart from, and sometimes in competition with, ownership. He admits, following Holmes, that one
reason to protect possession is to preserve social peace and to respect
people’s natural instinct of fighting to protect objects they have
brought within their control.209 But, like Pollock and Maitland, Callahan finds this explanation wanting.210 Callahan also doubts that the
principle of relativity-of-title can explain much. After all, he muses,
we probably protect “pure possession” divorced from ownership
206. Id. at 10. The only true adverse possessor under the approach in Lutz, Callahan pointed out, would thus be someone who “has no views whatsoever.” Id.
207. Id. at 11–12.
208. Id. at 13–15. Among the forces leading to consolidation in property, Callahan
notes three in particular. First, there is the financial and practical imperative to save
time and resources in accomplishing transactions, as demonstrated by the pressure for
simplification in the law of future interests. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 16–19. One
senses here the same instinct that would later appear fully theorized in Merrill and
Smith’s account of how the need for transactional standardization could produce a
limited number of property forms. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.
J. 1 (2000). Second, there is the general movement to reform property law by way of
statute; CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 20 (noting how “[t]he academic law of personal
property goes on with its foxes, deer and fish, in blissful disregard of the game laws”).
Third, there is “further analysis,” by which Callahan meant the work of analytical
reconceptualization by judges and academics who gradually identify outdated categories and replaced them with more unified and coherent systems of thought, as exemplified by the gradual unification of personal and real property, the unification of
corporeal and incorporeal property, and the consolidation of easements and profits.
Id. at 22–26.
209. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 33–36.
210. Many people who have temporary physical control of things (for instance, a
servant handling the goods of his employer) are not honored with possessory protection, Callahan notes. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 37–38. He also acknowledges,
though, that in more primitive societies, especially where literacy is limited, possession does serve as a useful proxy for ownership. Thus, possession is “vestigial; it is the
tailbone of property.” Id. at 38.
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much less often than we think we do.211 And, to the extent we do so, it
is probably “because we simply haven’t taken the trouble to stop.”212
At the end of the day, Callahan suggests that the most plausible rationale for possessory protection is simply to relieve real owners “of the
necessity of proving their titles . . . .”213 But even this functional advantage, he suggests, is relatively small, at least when compared to the
gains that might be achieved by simplifying the law and discarding the
whole business.214
Callahan presented his own historical description and doctrinal
evaluation of American adverse-possession law in his second chapter.
The details of this thirty-page account are interesting,215 but ultimately less important than his general theme—that the inevitable and
salutary movement toward law reduction and simplification would be
furthered in adverse possession by remembering that the fundamental
question is simply whether the statute of limitation has barred the true
owner’s cause of action.216 This doctrinal conclusion is quite curious,
however, because Callahan also acknowledges throughout his analysis
that courts increasingly focus on the opposite side of the coin.217 In
this sense, Callahan predicts—and to some extent straddles—both
sides of the Helmholz-Cunningham debate that emerged twenty years
later.218
In his third and final chapter, Callahan subjects adverse possession
to a teleological critique, contending that we will only be able to reform the doctrine sensibly if we understand its real purposes.219 Here,
much like Jeffrey Stake,220 Callahan disposes of almost all of the traditional rationales for adverse possession. At the same time we also see
Callahan acting as a kind of new critic, probing through a series of
close readings of the language used to justify the doctrine and expos211. Id. at 39 (“How may thieves recover for conversion by other thieves? How
many adverse possessors actually become successful plaintiffs before the statute has
run?”).
212. Id. at 39.
213. Id. at 40.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 53–77. Like Lon Fuller, Callahan suggests that most of the traditional
elements of adverse possession could be swept away and all that courts really need to
ask is whether there has been possession. Id. at 64. He is also critical of any attempt to
demand a particular state of mind from the claimant. Id. at 66–73. Ever witty, Callahan notes how conditional intent rules under the hostility-claim-of-right element have
taken what started out as a “claim of right” and turned it into a “claim of wrong.” Id.
at 72.
216. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 74–76.
217. Id. at 59–66.
218. See infra Section IV.A.
219. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 81–82.
220. Callahan’s critique predicts much of Stake, supra note 29, but he lacks Stake’s
sophisticated background in behavioral psychology. Perhaps Callahan’s exposure to
the social science milieu at Yale when he worked with Underhill Moore also explains
how Callahan could arrive at a position similar to Stake.
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ing the inherent tautologies in many of the rationales, without committing himself to any moral, philosophical or economic
justification.221
Toward the end of this chapter, however, Callahan turns to the
broadest “social” purpose traditionally offered in support of adverse
possession, that is, to quote the 1623 Statute of Limitation, the purpose of “quieting of men’s estates,” which Callahan takes to refer, not
to the interests of a particular defendant in ejectment, but rather “the
more specific policy of facilitating transfers of land.”222 This is an important objective, Callahan admits, as it animated much property law
reform over the centuries.223 Using a functional approach, Callahan
points out that a prospective purchaser wants to know two things: (1)
that the prospective vendor really owns the land he purports to sell;
and (2) that the vendor owns all of the land he purports to sell, not
just part of it.224 Callahan then asks whether adverse possession is the
most efficient “device” to answer those questions.225 While he was
neither the first nor the last property law scholar to use this kind of
functionalist critique, Callahan’s analysis is provocative.
First, Callahan acknowledges that if the United States were to adopt
a Torrens system of land title registration, “adverse possession would
be not only unnecessary but undesirable.”226 But since we are destined, in his opinion, to struggle on with record title and our recording
acts, Callahan recalibrates and observes that adverse possession enters
the picture in only three paradigmatic transactional settings and the
doctrine actually facilitates land transactions in only one of those settings. In the first situation, a prospective purchaser performs a title
examination and discovers that someone other than the purported
vendor has been in long-term possession of the land and actually appears to have a perfect chain of title with an accurate description and
survey.227 In the second, a prospective purchase performs a title examination and discovers that record title is in the prospective vendor and
“there is no substantial doubt about it . . . .”228 In the third, a prospective purchaser performs a title examination and discovers that the “record itself is not perfect but it looks fairly good for the prospective
221. In this second chapter, Callahan exposes the logical and linguistic fallacies of
not only the notion that adverse possession is “designed to protect against stale claims
after evidence has become lost, memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared,” CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 83, but also the statute of repose, reliance interest, neglectful owner and developmental rationales of adverse possession with
refreshing candor and wit. Id. at 84–92.
222. Id. at 93 (internal quotes omitted).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 94.
225. See id. at 95–96.
226. See id. at 99.
227. See id. at 101.
228. Id. at 102.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL101.txt

40

unknown

Seq: 40

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

22-DEC-17

12:04

[Vol. 5

vendor. It has its odd spots, which conceivably may be defects, but
perhaps, on the other hand, are not.”229
Callahan’s useful insight here is to point out that in the first two
situations, adverse possession actually either impedes market transactions or makes no real difference. In the first situation, what we might
call complete misalignment of title and possession, the prospective purchaser certainly will not go forward with the transaction by relying
solely on the vendor’s long-term possession beyond the statute of limitations. Instead, if he is well advised at all, he will require that all
doubts about title be eliminated through a quiet title action or a quitclaim transfer between the possessor and record owner. In this instance, the existence of adverse possession actually holds up
transactions until doubts can be resolved by a court or private
negotiation.230
In the second situation, what we might call complete alignment of
title and possession, Callahan observes that the fact that the vendor
has been in possession of the land for longer than the statutory period
generally does not give the prospective purchaser any greater peace of
mind before entering the transaction.231 It is possible that the vendor’s
long-term possession might wipe out some errant non-record claims of
a true owner, but the doctrine’s pitfalls and doctrinal limits, such as
statutory disabilities, mean that the net gain in transactional assurance
is “very small, if it exists at all.”232
It is only in the third situation, what we might call probable alignment of title and possession with some tricky spots, that adverse possession serves to substantially enhance the facilitation of land
transactions.233 This is not a trivial category. As Ballantine reminded
us back in 1918,234 and as many contemporary real estate practitioners
are likely to attest today, many routine real estate transfers will always
be plagued by this kind of uncertainty because of innocent conveyancing mistakes made in the past. Here, Callahan admits that adverse
possession can be useful precisely because, if the prospective vendor
has been in possession for longer than the statutory period, that possession might well cure these identifiable “odd spots” (not to mention
even some “unknown unknowns”), even though the doctrine is not a
complete guarantee because of the disabilities and other problems associated with proving adverse possession in any case.
To be sure, Callahan is not particularly generous here, suggesting
only that the doctrine provides some additional transactional facilita229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
See id. at 100–01.
See id. at 102.
Id.
See id. at 102–03.
Ballantine, supra note 93, at 135.
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tion “but not very much.”235 Although many current transactional
lawyers would question his quantification, Callahan is probably right
that adverse possession offers its greatest transactional value in these
cases where it helps to assure parties that the transferor has title and
boundaries are defensible even when, in all likelihood, adverse possession might never be necessary to prove them.236 In other words, adverse possession provides additional assurance to a prospective
purchaser or lender (or, in actuality, to the title insurance company)
“of protection against claims which may exist, but which probably do
not.”237 Callahan’s analysis is summarized in the figure below.
FIGURE 1
State of Apparent Title

Effect of Adverse Possession

Complete Misalignment of Title and
Possession

Negative – Holds Up Transactions

Complete Alignment of Title and
Possession

None – No Net Gain or Harm

Probable Alignment of Title and
Possession with Tricky Spots

Some Additional Benefit – Mainly
Transactional Assurance

All of this analysis from a transactional perspective leads Callahan
to an important and counter-intuitive insight; in the last two
transactional settings at least, possession is really unrelated to our
primary concern. What we really want to do, if we take the quiet title
rationale seriously, is “to bar claims inconsistent with the record title
unless they are asserted within a reasonable period.”238 The extent of
the record title holder’s possession should not matter. In these cases,
Callahan asks, “[w]hy, then, don’t we just bar the old claims?”239
Callahan’s answer is one that many contemporary scholars
eventually turned to over the years.240 He points out that,
notwithstanding adverse possession, most states bar old claims that
are inconsistent with at least the more recent transactions found in the
chain of title through other means, namely curative acts and
marketable title acts. These statutory innovations “wipe out the
capacity of certain defects to upset the title after a certain length of
235. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 103.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 104 (emphasis in original).
239. Id. (emphasis in original).
240. See Stake, supra note 29, at 2441–49 (arguing that marketable title acts are a
superior tool for quieting title, that betterment acts can deal with innocent
encroachers, and noting the increasing accuracy of modern surveying techniques);
Fennell, supra note 137, at 1063–64 (pointing to marketable title acts and title
insurance as alternative risk reduction tools).
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time.”241 From the transactional perspective, Callahan calls curative
acts “adverse possession without the possession . . . .”242 In Callahan’s
view, marketable title acts are potentially even more far-reaching, but
are also more complicated in that they provide that “all outstanding
interests which may affect the record title, such as easements, future
interests, and the like, are invalid unless they are re-asserted on the
record once every thirty years, or once every forty years.”243 Callahan
speculates that marketable title acts would spread widely.244
In the long run, Callahan guesses that, at least with respect to issues
of title, the increasing adoption of marketable title acts and the
extension of curative acts might make adverse possession less and less
valuable so that in time it might make sense to jettison the doctrine
entirely.245 When it came to boundary disputes, Callahan was more
uncertain, willing at least to recognize that adverse possession might
still perform a valuable assurance function, especially in smaller and
more routine transactions where the stakes involved might not justify
new surveys for every transfer.246
Callahan’s final plea regarding adverse possession is decidedly
rhetorical. He calls for a change in how we talk about adverse
possession:
The question in this whole matter, it seems to me, is not whether
I’ve been right in what I’ve said about the purpose of the doctrine of
adverse possession, or whether I’ve made proper deductions, or
whether I haven’t missed this or that important aspect of the matter.
I’ll concede on that. The real question is whether it isn’t better to
talk in this way than to purport to solve a problem by an incantation, such as the assertion that disseisin is an intentional act.247

Perhaps this call for a new rhetoric for adverse possession, which Callahan demonstrates throughout his book, is itself Callahan’s most significant accomplishment. In both his skeptical, close reading of
traditional rationales and his powerful, functional critique that anticipated much of future law and economics scholarship devoted to ad241. CALLAHAN, supra note 2, at 105.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 106.
246. See id. at 106–07. Turning to whether all adverse possession claimants should
be required to possess by color of title and claim of right to eliminate so called “mere
squatters” from the class of protected claimants, Callahan hedged. On one hand, he
acknowledges that to provide additional assurance to a prospective purchaser that the
title of a vendor is secure, it might make sense to require color of title and claim of
right. On the other hand, he notes that these requirements cause difficulty in
boundary disputes because typically the claimant will not have title to the disputed
strip of land. On balance, he suggests that, from a transactional perspective at least, it
would not be worthwhile to add these additional requirements. Id. at 108–09.
247. Id. at 111.
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verse possession, Callahan actually created a new way to talk about
adverse possession.
IV. RECONSIDERING

THE

HELMHOLZ-CUNNINGHAM DEBATE

Richard Helmholz’s article, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, precipitated the end of the first long phase of adverse possession
talk in American property law scholarship.248 In this article, Helmholz
acknowledges the intellectual elegance of the “dominant view” of
American adverse possession law and, in particular, the notion that
courts should focus on a “possessor’s physical relationship to the
land” rather than speculate on the possessor’s state of mind.249 The
problem, however, based on his research, was that this objective approach was “contradicted by the case law.”250 According to his review
of the vast majority of cases that were reported from 1966 to 1983,
courts were actually deciding cases based on their appreciation of an
adverse possessor’s subjective intent.251 In Helmholz’s account, even
though courts typically did not require the adverse possession claimant to plead and prove “good faith” as an element of his claim or
defense, the knowing trespasser generally stood “lower in the eyes of
the law” and was less likely to acquire title than a trespasser who believed he was “occupying what is his already.”252 In short, the dominant view that “pure, non-permissive possession and consequent
accrual of a cause of action in ejectment provide the determinative
test” was unsupported by the case law; indeed, it was a prescriptive
fiction perpetrated by academic commentators out of touch with the
law in practice.253
Roger Cunningham, a co-author of William Stoebuck, saw things
differently. As most observers of American property law scholarship
are aware, Cunningham wrote a long reply to Professor Helmholz in
an attempt to show that Helmholz was wrong on almost every
count.254 To defend his claims, Helmholz responded to Cunningham.255 In turn, Cunningham offered a final rejoinder.256
Many American scholars stop here. They dutifully acknowledge the
controversy but often cite Helmholz’s initial article as if it were the
248. See R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 Wash. U. L.
Q. 331 (1983) [hereinafter Helmholz, Subjective Intent].
249. Id. at 331. Helmholz also admitted that this view was consistent with the purposes of quieting land titles and promoting land transactions and stressed that it was
approved by all the major authorities. Id. at 331–32.
250. Id. at 332.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 2.
255. R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent, A Response to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 65, 66 (1986) [hereinafter Helmholz, Response].
256. Roger A. Cunningham, More on Adverse Possession: A Rejoinder to Professor
Helmholz, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 1167, 1168 (1986) [hereinafter Cunningham, Rejoinder].
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final word, without much concern for the substance of Cunningham’s
detailed objections or his motivations.257 Although one could easily
write an entire article exploring all of the intricacies of the HelmholzCunningham argument and weighing the merits of each scholar’s
claims, Section A of this Part identifies and analyzes ten primary
sources of contention and briefly attempts to assess the impact of
those narrow debates on subsequent adverse possession discourse.
Section B makes several broader claims about the long-term impact of
the Helmholz-Cunningham debate on American property law scholarship more generally.
A. Ten Specific Bones of Contention
The following review of ten specific subjects of dispute largely follows the structure of Helmholz’s and Cunningham’s articles. In addition to analyzing the specific nature of those arguments, it assesses the
level of significance of those specific arguments and identifies the elements of the debate that have likely had the most lasting impact on
contemporary adverse possession discourse in particular and property
law scholarship more generally.
1. Are There Too Many Adverse Possession Cases?
Helmholz initially asserts that an overabundance of reported adverse possession decisions appeared in the eighteen years preceding
his article and that too many of these decisions involve “relatively insignificant pieces of land” or “backyard boundary disputes.”258 The
cause of this litigation explosion, he claims, is the law’s failure to
achieve clarity regarding the claimants’ subjective intent.259
Cunningham disagrees not only with Helmholz’s claims about the
relative quantity of adverse-possession cases, at least as compared to
other areas of property law, but also with Helmholz’s assessment of
the subject of those decisions. First, Cunningham notes that at least as
represented by page counts in the Decennial Digests, the law of adverse possession is only modestly more contested than the law of bail257. A chief example is Merrill’s seminal article on adverse possession, though to
be fair Merrill’s piece was published a year before Cunningham’s first reply. Merrill,
supra note 22, at 1122–23 (discussing Helmholz’s findings without doubting their accuracy). See also Fennell, supra note 137, at 1037–38 (same without noting Cunningham’s critique). Stake notes the controversy, but does not delve into the details,
observing simply that after “many rounds of argument, readers are left uncertain as to
how many cases require good faith.” Stake, supra note 29, at 2431.
258. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 333.
259. In particular, Helmholz claims that it was the disjunction between the hornbook approach and judges’ ethical concern about allowing a “knowing trespasser to
gain good title” that causes so much uncertainty and explains the surge in adverse
possession litigation he observes. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL101.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 45

DISSEISIN, DOUBT, AND DEBATE

22-DEC-17

12:04

45

ments.260 Second, many of the 850 reported adverse possession cases
collected in the Decennial Digests between 1966 and 1981 that Helmholz examines concern issues other than the claimant’s subjective intent, according to Cunningham.261 Lastly, Cunningham observes that
Helmholz only cites “about 105 cases” as “directly supporting his conclusions”262 i.e., less than 10 reported decisions per year across the
United States.
Helmholz’s response on this issue is relatively mild. He suggests
that when it comes to litigation frequency a better subject of comparison for adverse possession can be found in the law of trespass, observing that, under a Decennial Digest page comparison, adverse
possession is about three times as frequently the subject of reported
decisions as trespass.263
Cunningham sticks with his guns in rejoinder, stressing that adverse
possession cases constitute a miniscule fraction of all reported appellate court decisions in civil cases.264 Although he admits that one reason adverse possession cases continue to appear with some regularity
is the “continuing confusion of the courts as to the meaning of the
‘claim of right’ requirement,”265 Cunningham contends that the more
likely explanation lies in the difficult factual nature of the other elements of adverse possession, particularly the challenge of drawing a
line between permissive and adverse possession.266 It is very difficult
to know how important this initial quantitative and qualitative skirmish has been, but one suspects that Helmholz’s tone of astonishment
at the alleged frequency of adverse possession litigation, his explanation for the surge, and his remarks about the relatively small stakes
actually involved may have subtly influenced subsequent property law
scholars more than Cunningham’s rebuttal.267
2. Do Intermediate Appellate Court Decisions Matter and What
About the Texas Court of Civil Appeals?
A second, somewhat related dispute concerns the significance of intermediate appellate court decisions. Cunningham starts this row by
260. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 2, n.5 (noting that the respective
volumes of the Decennial Digests contained a total of 169 pages devoted to “Adverse
Possession” compared to 112 devoted to “Bailment”).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 76 nn.41–42.
264. Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1168–69.
265. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 59. Like Callahan before him, Cunningham cites Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28 (N.Y. 1952), as a prime example of confusion over claim of right. Id. at 60–61 n.238 (quoting CALLAHAN, supra
note 2, at 10).
266. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 61.
267. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 137, at 1077 (identifying the “boundary dispute”
as the prototypical adverse possession case); Radin, supra note 29, at 746 (identifying
three paradigm adverse possession cases, one of which is the modest boundary case).
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observing that almost half of the decisions cited by Helmholz in support of his major claim are intermediate appellate court decisions, and
thus of only limited precedential value.268 He also notes that Helmholz relies upon an “inordinate” number of decisions from the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, whose panels are reportedly the subject of
“humorous comment” among lawyers in Texas and elsewhere.269
Helmholz takes particularly sharp umbrage at these charges and
fires off several pages of stinging rebuke in the final section of his
Response. He “plead[s] guilty” that he considered many intermediate
appellate court decisions in formulating his conclusions, but he defends their relevance by pointing out that his interest was not in
describing what “the role of subjective intent in adverse possession
cases should be,” but rather in describing “what it is.”270 In fact, when
analyzing a subject like adverse possession, where the rules are old,
fairly static, and subject to wide interpretation, Helmholz contends
that legal commentators should be more interested in what judges and
juries are doing with the rules in specific factual contexts than in the
latest pronouncement by a state supreme court.271
Interestingly, Helmholz also confesses that he used a “descriptive
‘case bound’ approach” in his initial article,272 but argues in his Response that property law analysis should become more empirically rigorous. An analysis of how trial courts apply the rules and elements of
adverse possession would be an even better study.273 In the end,
Helmholz deploys this minor dispute, as he does with several of the
more significant doctrinal disputes, to cast himself as a vigorous legal
realist, a scholar interested in what courts actually do, while casting
Cunningham as a tired, prescriptive theorist, “less interested in the
realities of the law of adverse possession than in upholding the theoretically ‘correct’ rule.”274 The implications for future property law

268. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 2. Cunningham further disparages decisions of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, noting the “widely varying quality of such
panels.” Id. at 2 n.6.
269. Id. at 2 n.6.
270. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 100.
271. Id. at 100–01.
272. Id. at 99.
273. Id. at 101. On this point, Cunningham assures his readers that he, like Helmholz, recognizes that an analysis of trial court rulings would be ideal, but admits that
he, too, was unwilling to undertake such a task. Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note
256, at 1170 n.23.
274. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 102. Helmholz’s humorous rebuttal to
Cunningham on the credibility and influence of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
features his report on telephone calls to lawyers and judges who defended the reputation of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, and a comparison of the number of times
Texas Court of Civil Appeals and the Michigan intermediate appellate courts had
been cited by foreign jurisdictions regarding adverse possession. Id. at 100 n.149.
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scholarship are obvious; many property law scholars would choose to
be seen like Helmholz, not like Cunningham.275
3. Is an Inquiry into the Accrual of a Cause of Action for
Ejectment “Laughable”?
Another major disagreement between Helmholz and Cunningham
restages the dispute that had engaged many previous generations of
property scholars: Should adverse possession be conceptualized primarily as a statute of limitations problem or should it be viewed as an
original means of acquiring of title, i.e., as positive prescription?
Helmholz contends that courts rarely ask when a cause of action for
ejectment has begun to accrue against the possessor, despite the emphatic endorsement of this approach by the American Law of Property.276 Instead, he observes, courts almost always ask whether the
claimant has fulfilled the five positive requirements for adverse possession, regardless of whether the state has a prescriptive title statute
spelling out such requirements.277 In a phrase that likely galled Cunningham, Helmholz remarks: “To approach that question by asking
about the availability of ejectment is to invite laughter.”278
Cunningham responds to Helmholz’s claim on this subject with
pages of detailed rebuttal and many lengthy footnotes.279 Although he
concedes that many reported decisions did focus on the positive requirements of adverse possession, Cunningham argues that this practice simply reflects judicial attempts to develop criteria to determine
when a cause of action had begun to accrue and whether the statute of
275. Cunningham’s response to Helmholz on this point reveals that he was particularly stung by Helmholz’s remarks and concerned about his own reputation. He points
out, for instance, that he never said intermediate appellate court decisions were not
worthy of any consideration and that he gave them lots of consideration in his article.
Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1169. Adopting a humorous tone, he also
stresses that the batting average for the Texas Court of Civil Appeals when their cases
were reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court (about .330) was not high for an appellate
court, though it might be excellent for a baseball player. Id. at 1169–70.
276. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 334 (citing 3 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY § 15.4, at 774). This portion of the American Law of Property was taken
verbatim from Walsh’s 1938 article. Compare Walsh, supra note 139, at 537–48, with 3
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 122, § 15.4, at 774–85.
277. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 334–35. The only exceptions to
this approach, Helmholz observes, occur when (a) the true owner holds a future interest, (b) the true owner suffers from a disability recognized by statute, or (c) the dispute involves co-tenants. Id. at 336. See also Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at
67 (emphasizing the contrast between his conclusions and the “uncompromisingly objective approach to adverse possession” taken by the American Law of Property); id.
at 76–78 (reiterating his claim that a positive prescription framework had replaced the
accrual of the cause of action framework in American law).
278. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 335; see also Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1170 (noting, in particular, Helmholz’s “to invite laughter”
comment).
279. See Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 3–16.
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limitations had run.280 This development was necessary and logical,
Cunningham observed, as American courts increasingly recognized
that the statute of limitation did not just bar a true owner’s recovery
and extinguish his title, but also led to a new title created in the
claimant.281
In response, Helmholz stresses that the difference between him and
Cunningham on this conceptual point was important because the positive prescription framework makes it much easier for a court to focus
on an adverse possessor’s state of mind.282 In other words, Helmholz
acknowledges that the evolution of conceptual structures of doctrine
can facilitate a more moralistic or policy-oriented approach to a property law dispute.
Although Cunningham does not re-engage with Helmholz again on
this issue,283 it remains a fundamental point of contention between the
two scholars. It may seem “academic” today, but it was a matter of
considerable pride and, for Cunningham at least, this debate linked
his view of adverse possession to many scholars who came before
him—particularly William Walsh.284 Helmholz could have—and perhaps did—take comfort in an equally long lineage of scholarship
traceable through Ballantine and Bordwell that emphasized how adverse possession had become Americanized into a new form of positive prescription.285
4. Are Adverse Possessors the Same as Trespassers?
One of the less significant disagreements between Helmholz and
Cunningham concerns the use of the word “trespasser” by Helmholz
to describe adverse possessors.286 Cunningham mildly upbraids Helmholz for this terminological blurring, noting that a cause of action in
ejectment serves to put the true owner back in possession, while the
objective of a cause of action for trespass is to collect damages or to
enjoin future trespasses, and, therefore, adverse possession should be
seen as “more than a mere temporary wrongful interference (or a se280. Id. at 4.
281. Id. at 5. Here, Cunningham relies extensively on Ballantine. Id. at 5 n.10. In his
rejoinder, Cunningham essentially repeats this same argument, but also maintains
that Helmholz’s claim that the distinction between adverse possession and prescription had blurred is mistaken. For details, see Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256,
at 1171 n.31.
282. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 78 (observing that if courts focus on
accrual, they have “little cause to consider whether the possessor had regarded himself as the owner,” but if “they ask whether the occupant has met a series of affirmative tests, one of which is ‘hostility’ or ‘claim of right,’ then it will be much easier for
them to examine the possessor’s subjective intent”).
283. Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1170–71.
284. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.
285. See discussion supra Section II.C.1.
286. See Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 334–35, 338.
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ries of interferences) with the true owner’s exclusive right to
possession.”287
Helmholz acknowledges Cunningham’s point here, but he still
claims that his use of the term is “not incorrect” because a “trespass
does not become any less a trespass for being continued.”288 Moreover, as Helmholz notes, many courts and scholars, even the American
Law of Property, have made the same synonym substitution.289 While
this dispute has likely not had much lasting significance on American
property law, perhaps it signaled a growing recognition that the distinctions between different kinds of intrusions on a person’s property—violations of the right to exclude—were worthy of careful
conceptual analysis in their own right.290
5.

“Claim of Right”: A Useful Tool to Provide Elasticity or a
Source of Confusion?

Another technical dispute between Helmholz and Cunningham
concerns the term claim of right. Helmholz initially argues that courts
use this term strategically to evaluate the subjective intentions of an
adverse possessor, especially when the statute of limitations or guiding
judicial authority in a state do not otherwise clearly indicate whether
good faith—or bad faith for that matter—is required.291 In short,
claim of right is an elastic linguistic placeholder that allows courts to
take subjective intentions into account.
Cunningham strongly objects. He chastises Helmholz for failing to
appreciate that the term emerged from the New York Revised Statutes of 1828, which required claim of title. Early New York cases only
required a showing of non-subordination by the adverse possessor to
the true owner’s title and shifted the burden of proof to the paper title
owner as soon as an adverse possession claimant introduced evidence
of wrongful possession.292 More generally, Cunningham attributes
most of the judicial confusion over claim of right to the doctrine of
disclaimer, which, though once an important part of adverse possession law, misled courts in many cases.293 Like his treatise co-author
William Stoebuck, Cunningham acknowledges that the term claim of
287. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 9.
288. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 79.
289. Id. at 79 n.53 (citing 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.2, at 762, § 15.4, at
771).
290. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining
Property Rights, 14 J. LEG. STUDIES 13 (1985); Merrill, supra note 22. Both of Merrill’s groundbreaking articles were published in 1985, two years after Helmholz’s first
article on adverse possession, and one year before Cunningham’s Reply.
291. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 332, 357.
292. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 16–18. Cunningham also notes that an
adverse possession claimant could always do or say something to cloak his possession
with a permissive character, thus negating a claim of right. Id. at 18–20.
293. Id. at 21–22.
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right adds little value to adverse possession analysis and often just
leads to confusion in certain contexts.294
In response, Helmholz argues that the mutability of terms such as
“hostility” and “claim of right” is precisely his point. They permit
courts to “take account of evidence of the possessor’s state of mind
when such evidence exists.”295 Although he acknowledges that a fair
amount of adverse possession litigation arising under the heading of
claim of right simply concerns whether a claimant’s possession was
initially permissive and not whether the claimant’s subsequent conduct made that possession adverse, Cunningham maintained his basic
position.296 In the end, this dispute was highly technical but nevertheless intense, revealing a sharp divide over the proper interpretative
approach to adverse possession cases with Helmholz focusing on how
courts manipulate terms to achieve instrumental ends and Cunningham insisting on doctrinal tradition, logic, and identifying unwarranted judicial deviations from that tradition and logic.
6. Are Statutory and Jurisprudential Requirements of
Good Faith Significant?
Helmholz is careful to acknowledge that in some states good faith is
either a statutory or express common law requirement.297 He also
notes that in some states, the statutory period for adverse possession
is shorter if the claimant can prove entry under “color of title,” that is,
under “an apparently valid muniment of title,”298 which necessarily
requires proof that the claimant honestly believed the purported title
was valid.
Despite these concessions, Cunningham still claims that in too many
of the cases Helmholz cites to support his contention that honest possession had become an important consideration, good faith was actually a mandatory element of proof under the relevant statutes.299
Further, in some of these instances, Cunningham suggests that the
294. Id. at 17–18 n.58 (noting potential for confusion in cases involving claims to an
estate less than fee simple and in mistaken boundary cases); Stoebuck, supra note 178,
at 73 (contending that claim of right simply means “hostile”). Stoebuck, in fact, called
for elimination of any consideration of subjective intent in adverse possession. Id. at
80.
295. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 69.
296. Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1172 (quoting Cunningham, Reply,
supra note 153, at 61).
297. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 337. Helmholz cited N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 37-1-22 (1978) as an example of a statutory requirement of good faith, and
Washington as an example of judicial imposition of a good faith requirement. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 337 n.21.
298. Id. at 337.
299. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 23–24 (discussing Michigan, Washington, and New York statutes, among others, and noting that such statutes either require color of title to gain title more quickly or to gain the benefit of constructive
possession beyond the bounds of title).
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good faith requirement imposes only a “minimal restriction” in color
of title cases.300 Finally, and perhaps most important to him, Cunningham stresses that in some states, most notably Iowa, the common law
rule requiring good faith dates back to the late nineteenth century,
thus negating Helmholz’s detection of a significant recent judicial
movement favoring good faith claimants.301
Helmholz did not re-engage Cunningham on this point except to
note that sometimes the highest court in a state will, as had recently
happened in Washington, explicitly excise considerations of subjective
intent from adverse possession analysis.302 This was a revealing point
to make because in some sense it conceded the appeal of Cunningham’s objective approach to adverse possession.
7. When Good Faith is not Required, Why Do Courts Still
Address the Possessor’s Honest or Mistaken Belief?
Perhaps the most hotly contested disagreement in the entire Helmholz-Cunningham debate concerned cases in which good faith was not
an enumerated element of a claim or defense, yet courts would still, in
Helmholz’s words, “cite the existence and the relevance of good
faith.”303 These cases prove, according to Helmholz, that good faith
really matters even when it is not supposed to matter.
As evidence, Helmholz first turns to what he calls the “normal
case” of adverse possession—a boundary dispute between two neighboring landowners—and argues that courts in these cases routinely
reward mistaken, good faith possessors and punish knowing trespassers.304 According to Helmholz, Reeves v. Metropolitan Trust Company,305 a boundary dispute case concerning two parcels of land that
had been used and enclosed by the claimants, illustrates this phenomenon. In Reeves, the Arkansas Supreme Court awarded the claimants
ownership of the parcel they possessed in a good faith, albeit mistaken
belief they owned, but it rejected their claim to the second parcel,
which the claimants “admit[ted] candidly” they knew did not belong
to them.306 In further support, Helmholz cites developments in New
Jersey and several other states, where courts rejected older judicial
authorities following the Maine rule (that required an intent to claim
property beyond one’s property line in mistaken boundary cases) and
instead adopted the Connecticut rule (under which “the possessor’s
300. Id. at 25.
301. Id. at 37 n.136.
302. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 106 (discussing Chaplin v. Sanders, 676
P.2d 431, 436 (Wash. 1984)).
303. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 337.
304. Id. at 337–38; see also Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 70 (reiterating
that a paradigm successful adverse possession case involves a purchaser who mistakenly possesses more land than actually described in the property description of deed).
305. Reeves v. Metro. Tr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 2 (Ark. 1973).
306. Id. at 3–4.
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lack of actual hostility or desire to appropriate his neighbor’s property
is irrelevant.”)307 To Helmholz, this evolution reflects growing judicial
preference for the interests of an innocent, mistaken adverse possessor and disapproval of the intentional wrongdoer.308
Cunningham, of course, disagrees. In general, he characterizes most
of the judicial references to a possessor’s good faith or honest mistaken belief in these cases as meaningless dicta, while also suggesting
that many of the cases cited by Helmholz do not actually support his
claim.309 To start, Cunningham notes that in many of the boundary
cases cited by Helmholz, the true owners had actually invited courts to
assert the Maine rule, only to ultimately have the courts reject that
invitation and instead follow the Connecticut rule.310 Drawing on
Bordwell and others, Cunningham aptly articulates the many reasons
why courts had rejected the Maine rule and adopted the Connecticut
rule.311 Further, Cunningham points out that Helmholz erred in attempting to argue that the shift from the Maine to the Connecticut
rule was a recent development, as it actually dated back to the first
half of the nineteenth century and continued to gain steam throughout
the twentieth century.312 According to Cunningham, the most significant problem with Helmholz’ reliance on these cases is that the consolidation of judicial opinion around the Connecticut rule in mistaken
boundary cases only reflects that judges came to see good faith possessors as equally worthy of prevailing as bad faith possessors, not more
worthy.313
Cunningham’s charge that Helmholz was taking judicial comments
out of context to show that good faith possession was increasingly important was founded on his analysis of three cases: (1) Miller v. Fitzpatrick,314 a 1967 Texas Court of Civil Appeal decision; (2) Reeves v.
Metropolitan Trust Company,315 the 1973 Arkansas Supreme Court
307. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 339.
308. Id. at 339–41 (citing Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969), along with
cases from New Hampshire, New York, Colorado, Oregon, Connecticut, Illinois, and
Indiana).
309. See generally Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 25–32.
310. Id. at 25–27 & nn.84–86 (observing that, in most of these cases, the true owner
had attempted to defeat the adverse possessor’s claims not by asserting that the claimant was acting in bad faith, but rather by asserting that the claimant’s possession was
not adverse because the claimant actually believed he owned the land in dispute).
311. Id. at 27–28.
312. Id. at 27 nn.90 & 98.
313. Id. at 29. See also Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1175 (asking why
Helmholz “did not acknowledge that the Connecticut rule cases are inconsistent with
his views about both bad faith and subjective intent, while the Maine rule cases,
though inconsistent with his views on either good faith or bad faith, are perfectly
consistent with his views about subjective intent,” and noting that “many jurisdictions
. . . still adhere to the Maine rule”).
314. Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 418 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1967,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
315. Reeves v. Metro. Tr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 2 (Ark. 1973).
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decision; and (3) Butler v. Hanson,316 a 1970 Texas Supreme Court
decision. Cunningham first shows that Helmholz misrepresented the
holding in Miller because the court held that the claimant failed to
acquire title by adverse possession despite his professed good faith.317
To his credit, Helmholz confesses this mistake regarding Miller, acknowledging that the court’s holding did not concern subjective intent.318 However, Cunningham does not let go of Miller. In his
rejoinder, he notes that one reason the adverse possession claimant
failed to acquire title in that case was because he believed the disputed
land belonged to him. In other words, he proposes that the Miller
court actually required bad faith intent—in direct opposition to Helmholz’s argument.319
Reeves is a more complicated matter, however, as the two scholars
simply disagree about what happened. Cunningham argues repeatedly
that the real reason the court ruled in favor of the true owner with
respect to the second parcel concerned the quality of their actual possession and direct admissions that they did not have any claim at all to
the land.320 Meanwhile, Helmholz fervently contends that his reading
of the decision is the more accurate one and characterizes Cunningham’s charges of misquotation as “astonishing.”321
In response to Cunningham’s accusation of selective quotation in
Butler v. Hanson,322 Helmholz defends with considerable force, arguing that the case “involved exactly the sort of finding about good faith
possession discussed above.”323 For his part, Cunningham does not
yield on Butler either, maintaining that a “careful reading . . . indicates
that the principal issue on appeal was whether there was at least some
evidence of adverse possession to support the jury’s verdict in favor of
the adverse claimant.”324 Cunningham observed that the opinion
“contains no mention whatever of good faith or honest mistake” and
316. Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1970).
317. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 30.
318. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 85.
319. Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1176–77 (offering a lengthy discussion of Miller with many sentences in italics).
320. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 31 (emphasizing a second quotation
provided by the court in Reeves: “Both he and his wife testified that they did not
mean to claim any land that they did not own.” Reeves, 498 S.W.2d at 4); see also
Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1181–83 (reiterating same).
321. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 85–87.
322. Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1970); Cunningham, Reply, supra note
153, at 31–32. The testimony of the successful adverse claimant in Butler that Helmholz originally cited for its attractive “homeliness” was this: “I figured it was mine, it
was in my fence line.” Butler, 455 S.W.2d at 951 (Smith, J., dissenting) (full text of
transcript relied upon by majority), cited in Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note
248, at 341.
323. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 85.
324. Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1177.
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that, moreover, it was not even clear that the claimant possessed in
good faith.325
Of all the disputes, this one seems to call into question the academic
honor of the two participants more than any of the others. But, from
today’s vantage point, we can perhaps recognize why both parties
were so upset. From Cunningham’s perspective, Helmholz appeared
to be cherry-picking a relatively small sample of reported decisions to
support the primary contention of his initial argument and, moreover,
had made some significant mistakes in describing those decisions. Further, with respect to decisions adopting the Connecticut rule for mistaken boundaries, Helmholz appeared to be reading more into them
than a narrow doctrinal description would properly permit. From
Helmholz’s perspective, Cunningham was blind to plain statements of
judicial favoritism on behalf of good faith claimants. In this instance,
time simply cannot heal real conflict.
8. What Happens to Bad Faith Possessors and What Explains
Their Fate?
Helmholz and Cunningham also disagree profoundly about the
meaning of cases in which there is clear evidence “that the adverse
possessor knew he was trespassing on the land of another at the time
of the initial appropriation.”326 These cases are just as important as
good faith cases to Helmholz’s general theory about the intrusion of
ethical considerations into adverse possession law. Helmholz admits
that “[t]he stress laid on the honesty of the possessor’s belief in many
of those opinions [cases involving good faith claimants] may be uncomfortable for the doctrine, but it is not directly contrary to it.”327
Accordingly, an essential element of his argument is that willful trespassers are often denied title precisely because of their bad faith.328
Helmholz thus turns to cataloguing the ways in which courts manage
to achieve this end without formally adopting a good faith
requirement.
Putting aside “all cases involving permissive possession,”329 Helmholz observes that courts most often punish bad faith possessors by
manipulating the elastic rubric “claim of right” to distinguish “knowing trespass from honest, but mistaken, appropriation.”330 According
to Helmholz, courts also frequently use this term to deny title to
claimants who they view as merely asserting “squatters rights.”331
Helmholz further notes that in several cases, courts characterize a
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 343.
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“knowing trespasser’s possession” as “neighborly,” “friendly,” or
“peaceable” and thus insufficiently hostile, even in the absence of an
explicit agreement or understanding suggesting that the possession is
clearly permissive.332 In other cases, Helmholz observes, courts do not
bother to disguise their unease with bad faith possession in the language of permissiveness, preferring simply to declare that such possession cannot fall under a claim of right.”333 Finally, Helmholz cites
numerous cases as supporting the proposition that, regardless of
whether affirmative proof of trespassing is present or circumstances
are just suspicious enough for courts to infer bad faith, courts will
often “refuse to find adverse possession,” strengthening their holdings
by referencing the rule that the burden of proof in adverse possession
lies with the claimant.334
Turning to cases in which bad faith possessors do succeed in acquiring title,335 Helmholz contends that their success can usually be attributed to a cluster of four “equitable” factors: (1) the claimant himself is
a “sympathy-inducing possessor”; (2) “an unsympathetic record
owner . . . knowingly slept on his rights”; (3) “the passage of a considerable period of time”; and (4) “improvements made on the land by
the hostile possessor.”336 Moreover, Helmholz claims, in only a small
handful of cases does a “truly hostile possessor” acquire title or obtain
a favorable ruling.337 In sum, in bad faith cases, just as in good faith
332. Id. at 343–44. Helmholz admits his own sympathies lay with the courts in these
cases. When two neighbors get along, one neighbor allowing the other to use his property informally, it would be unfair, Helmholz suggests, to allow the possessor to
“change his mind” and suddenly take advantage of the owner’s previous goodwill or
timidity. Id. at 344 n.58 (listing many examples of such cases).
333. Id. at 344–45 (listing many cases at notes 58 and 62). For example, when a
claimant offers to purchase the land in dispute from the record owner before the
statute of limitation has run, courts invariably seize on this evidence to show that the
claimant knew of a conflicting right and therefore cannot be said to have possessed
under a claim of right. Id. at 346. Confusingly, though, Helmholz appears to be discussing the problem of permissive possession here, which he says we must put aside at
the outset. Id. at 342; see also discussion infra note 353.
334. See id. at 345 (stating that these cases “represent a clear majority of recent
cases where knowing trespass on the part of the possessor has been shown”); id. at
345 n.62 (listing decisions).
335. In his response to Cunningham, Helmholz describes the typical bad faith case
as involving “a chain of circumstance,” which may initially involve some relatively
understandable but still knowing encroachment, perhaps motivated by convenience
or a desire to eliminate an eyesore, and which only later grows into an actual claim.
Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 70–71.
336. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 347–48. See also Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 94–95 nn.132–33 (citing additional cases to support his theory that when bad faith possessors prevail it is often because additional equities have
weighed in their favor). Helmholz gives a particularly striking account of the sympathetic bad faith possessor in his discussion of Gates v. Roberts, 350 S.W.2d 729 (Mo.
1961), discussed in Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 95 n.133.
337. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 348–49. For example, in a Nebraska case, Pettis v. Lozier, 290 N.W.2d 215 (Neb. 1980), the state supreme court
merely reverses a grant of summary judgment against a knowing adverse possessor,
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cases, Helmholz sees “equitable considerations” infiltrating an area of
law supposedly governed by a mechanistic title-shifting rule.338
Once again, Cunningham dissects Helmholz’ arguments and authorities, finding them all unpersuasive.339 He begins by blasting Helmholz
for factual mistakes reporting cases cited to demonstrate that sometimes courts do not even bother “to resort to any special characterization to deny the claim of a bad faith possessor . . . .”340 For example,
in a 1967 Texas Court of Civil Appeals case, Hoppe v. Sauter,341 Cunningham notes that the court held that the unabashed bad faith possessor had acquired title,342 even though Helmholz had cited it for the
exact opposite proposition.343 Cunningham also upbraids Helmholz
for quoting judicial statements from a 1978 case, Hansen v. National
Bank of Albany Park,344 that purportedly demonstrates the salience of
a claimant’s knowledge that his deed did not describe the land in dispute. Helmholz erred by not noting that these comments were subsequently “disapproved” by the Illinois Supreme Court in Joiner v.
Jansen,345 when the court reaffirmed the long-settled “pure possession” approach to adverse possession in Illinois.346 On this point,
Helmholz could retort that he had initially acknowledged the subsequent disapproval by the higher court.347
One of Cunningham’s broadest objections is that in most of Helmholz’ bad faith cases, courts had actually held that the adverse claimant “failed to establish one or more of the usual elements of adverse
possession,”348 thus rendering good or bad faith immaterial to the
holding. Even the one case that does provide substantial support for
Helmholz’s assertion that bad faith dooms an adverse claimant (the
thus only “holding that the possibility of his acquiring title was not foreclosed.” Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 348.
338. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 347.
339. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 31–32. Cunningham here is referring to
the core argument in Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 341–49.
340. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 34 (quoting Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 344).
341. Hoppe v. Sauter, 416 S.W.2d 912, 914–15 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1967,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
342. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 34.
343. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 344–45. Helmholz later admitted in an aside and a footnote his mistake regarding Hoppe. Helmholz, Response,
supra note 255, at 87 n.93.
344. Hansen v. Nat’l Bank of Albany Park in Chi., 376 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1978), discussed in Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 345.
345. Joiner v. Janssen, 421 N.E.2d 170, 173–74 (Ill. 1981).
346. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 34.
347. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 88 n.94. Helmholz could have also
pointed out that he had drawn attention to Hansen merely to argue that the lower
court’s view about a claimant’s knowledge and disregard of a true boundary line “represents the more common judicial approach.” Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note
248, at 345. Helmholz, however, does not cite any specific support for this particular
proposition in his initial article. Id.
348. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 36.
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1982 Iowa Supreme Court decision in Carpenter v. Ruperto)349 merely
recapitulates Iowa’s long-standing common law rule requiring good
faith as an express element, and thus does not demonstrate a new judicial trend.350 The list of Helmholz’s bad faith cases that Cunningham
challenges in this manner continues, but the pattern remains the
same.351 Cunningham also strongly counters Helmholz’s assertion that
courts often reject adverse possession claims by characterizing the
possession of claimants as “permissive” only to conceal their actual
moral disapproval of bad faith possession.352 In most of these cases,
Cunningham notes, there actually were serious issues of permissive
possession.353
Finally, Cunningham rejects Helmholz’s suggestion that in nine
cases in which an obvious bad faith claimant prevails, the outcome
depends on judicial weighing of the equities.354 In Cunningham’s reading, these cases more often emphasized the irrelevance of subjective
intentions and their holdings turned on other factors—in particular,
the all-important permissive versus hostile distinction.355 Further,
Cunningham notes that many of the cases Helmholz relies upon for
his weighing of the equities claim originated as quiet title actions—a
form of action deeply rooted in equity.356 Thus, it stands to reason
that courts would consider equitable factors.357 What is most surpris349. Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1982).
350. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 37. Cunningham traced Iowa’s good
faith rule back to 1896. Id. at 37 n.136.
351. See e.g., Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970); Miller v. Fitzpatrick, 418 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Moss
v. James, 411 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1967); Wilton Boat Club v. Hazell, 502 S.W.2d 273
(Mo. 1973), cited and discussed in Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at
342–43. For Cunningham’s objections regarding these decisions, see Cunningham, Reply, supra note 151, at 38–39.
352. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 39.
353. Id. at 40. Cunningham returns to this point in his rejoinder, countering what he
perceives as Helmholz’s charge that courts are often “disingenuous” in focusing on
permissive possession when, in fact, express or tacit permission has often been given
by the owner, creating a perfectly valid reason to deny an adverse possession claim.
Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1179. For instance, see Cunningham’s discussion of Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lilly White Church, 505 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ), in which “the inference that express
permission was given is practically inescapable.” Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153,
at 40 n.149. Cunningham also objects to Helmholz’s reliance on a number of cases in
which courts rule against adverse possession claimants because of evidence showing
that the claimant offered to purchase or lease the land in dispute. Id. at 41–44 (suggesting such cases are far more complicated than Helmholz is willing to acknowledge). See also Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1179–80 (arguing that cases
cited by Helmholz relating to offers to pay money to the true owner do not support
his claims).
354. Those nine cases are discussed in Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248,
at 348 nn.69–72. Cunningham’s critique begins at Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153,
at 46.
355. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 46 nn.178–79.
356. Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 62–63.
357. Id. at 62–63.
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ing, Cunningham exclaims, is the actual infrequency of judicial concern about the equities in these cases.358
9. Are the Exceptions Really that Exceptional?
In the final part of his article, Helmholz addresses three special categories of adverse possession cases (tax sale cases, grantor remaining
in possession cases, and co-tenancy cases) and finds that they either
(1) do not conflict with or, (2) in fact, support his general theory that
courts are becoming increasingly conscious of the subjective intent of
the possessor.359 Although Cunningham disagrees with Helmholz’s
reading of many of these cases,360 the disagreement between the two
scholars on this ground is, comparatively speaking, not quite as intense. Some of the disagreements, for example with regard to tax
sales, are highly technical in nature.361 Others, for example with regard to grantors in possession, reflect the scholars’ fundamental conflict over the role of ethical considerations in adverse possession
disputes.362 However, when it comes to co-tenants claiming adverse
possession, Helmholz and Cunningham actually find some common
ground, agreeing that successful claimants often do have some honest,
plausible reason to believe they own the disputed land.363
358. Id. at 63.
359. See generally Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 349–56.
360. See generally Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 46–58.
361. Compare Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 349–50 (contending
tax sale cases reveal a judicial tendency to prefer tax deed purchasers who can show
good faith at the time of purchase), with Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 46–48
(noting that many of these cases involve statutory requirements of color of title or
good faith and thus do not reveal any judicial tendency). See also Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1183 n.104 (expressing extreme dissatisfaction with Helmholz’s “egregiously” misleading reading of Brylinski v. Cooper, 624 P.2d 522 (N.M.
1981)).
362. Compare Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 351–52 (asserting that
courts routinely express concern about the unfairness of allowing a grantor to remain
in possession in derogation of his own deed unless the grantor can show some unusual
countervailing equity such as a mistaken understanding about the property boundary), with Cunningham, Reply, supra note 153, at 49–50 (asserting that Helmholz is
insufficiently attentive to the relational context of grantor in possession disputes and
fails to distinguish between cases where (1) the grantor and grantee are arms-length
strangers or the grantor and grantee are related by blood or marriage and the conveyance is often gratuitous and thus a strong presumption of permissive possession explains most outcomes and (2) cases involving grantors in possession of boundary
strips due to apparent mistake where the outcome is simply explained by application
of the Connecticut rule).
363. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 354–56; Cunningham, Reply,
supra note 153, at 58 (noting that it is unsurprising that many successful co-tenant
claimants are characterized as good faith possessors because, after all, “one must recognize that a cotenant will seldom, if ever, deliberately undertake in ‘bad faith’ to
acquire, by adverse possession, sole ownership of land held in cotenancy”). As Cunningham observes, a story usually explains occupation in these co-tenant cases—perhaps an oral agreement or family understanding, perhaps a grantee not aware that he
was acquiring a deed from a co-tenant, or perhaps just a co-tenant who occupies and
takes care of the land for so long that he reasonably assumes that the out-of-posses-
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10. What is the Job of a Legal Commentator?
At one point, Helmholz strategically reframes the entire debate as
one about the proper role of the legal commentator. In this staging,
Cunningham plays the dark knight, the defender of formalism and
Helmholz stars as the clairvoyant legal realist, revealing the underlying reasons that courts decide cases.364 Helmholz then counsels other
legal academics to be more attentive to the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive scholarship, suggesting that Cunningham allows his prescriptive ideals to distort his descriptive representation of
adverse possession case law whereas he (Helmholz) is content merely
to tell the truth about courts’ actions, regardless of whether those actions are consistent with hornbook law.365
In what must have been a particularly painful jab at Cunningham,
Helmholz contrasts Cunningham’s account of adverse possession with
William Stoebuck’s 1960 article addressing adverse possession in the
State of Washington.366 According to Helmholz, Stoebuck, unlike
Cunningham, carefully distinguishes between his own normative preference for an objective approach to adverse possession and the confusing “jungle” of case law he found in Washington.367
Surprisingly, Cunningham does not engage Helmholz on this subject.368 Instead, he reiterates that Helmholz’s primary argument (that
ethical considerations had come to pervade adverse possession law) is
descriptively inaccurate because courts’ actual practice is to determine
objectively whether a claimant has satisfied the “positive requirements” for adverse possession.369 For Cunningham, the absence of
overt references to ethical values by the courts does not require a legal commentator to unearth those considerations lying beneath the
surface of a decision in a judge’s psyche because those considerations
do not exist in the first place.
B. The Role of Ethical Values
One meta-question that looms over the entire dispute between
Helmholz and Cunningham emerges out of the final bone of contention discussed above. That meta-question is whether law itself should
sion co-tenants have relinquished their rights. Id. at 53–57. This characterization
matches up well with Helmholz’s description of co-tenant cases. See Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 354–56 (noting three ways co-tenants come to believe
they have an ownership interest).
364. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 104–06.
365. Id. at 104–05.
366. See generally Stoebuck, supra note 178; see also discussion supra Section III.A.
367. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 105–06. Helmholz even credits
Stoebuck for having influenced the Washington Supreme Court’s 1984 decision that
ultimately adopted an objective approach to adverse possession. Id. at 106 (citing
Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431, 436 (Wash. 1984) (en banc)).
368. Cunningham, Rejoinder, supra note 256, at 1183–85.
369. Id. at 1184–85.
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prioritize objective standards—like the pure possession approach favored by the American Law of Property—or welcome the consideration of ethical values. Given the discussion above, there is little doubt
that Cunningham probably favors the former position, although he
never overtly addresses the question beyond the realm of adverse
possession.
Helmholz’s stand on this meta-question is more complicated because it modulates over the course of the debate. In his initial article,
despite finding that courts often do take subjective intent into account, Helmholz quite emphatically states that the law of adverse possession should not incorporate an explicit good faith requirement. He
acknowledges that good faith was a requirement in Roman law and
asserts that it remains a requirement for acquisitive prescription in
modern civil law.370 He also notes that good faith is statutorily required in a number of common law states.371 Despite this, he still worries that “very little” would be gained by requiring good faith in
adverse possession cases elsewhere and “something good might be
lost.”372 A universal good faith requirement, he warns, might encourage courts to engage in “even more speculative explorations of
probable states of mind,” especially when evidence of a possessor’s
intent is already difficult to locate.373 When reliable state of mind evidence is available, Helmholz believes that courts can and do take it
into account in evaluating the hostile and claim of right requirements—thus properly rewarding good faith possessors and disallowing
claims of intentional trespassers.374 At the end of his first article,
Helmholz calls on other academic commentators merely to recognize,
as he does, that the “objective view” or “pure possession” approach to
adverse possession, though perhaps normatively preferable, is not
used as rigorously as its proponents would want because cases are
complex and, perhaps more importantly, when judges and juries confront human beings they sometimes cannot help but “prefer the claims
of an honest man over those of a dishonest man.”375
Towards the end of his response to Cunningham, however, Helmholz reverses himself. He aligns the pure possession approach to adverse possession to a more general view of the law that favors
“objective standards” over “moral considerations,” a view he links
370. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 356. Helmholz fails to acknowledge, however, that in France, as in Louisiana, immovables can be acquired by thirtyyear acquisitive prescription without just title or good faith. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.]
[CIVIL CODE] arts. 2262 & 690 (Fr.); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3486 (1983); 5 G.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & ALBERT TISSIER, CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS: PRESCRIPTION § 25, at 14–15 (La. St. L. Inst. & Jaro Mayda trans., West Publ’g Co. ed. 1972)
(4th ed. 1924).
371. Helmholz, Subjective Intent, supra note 248, at 357.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 358.
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with Justice Holmes and Dean Ames.376 Focusing on Holmes in particular, Helmholz stresses that Holmes’ “predilection for objective
standards in all areas of the law” had become something of “an idée
maı̂tresse, something of an obsession.”377 However, Helmholz claims
that the evolution of the law had not borne out Holmes’ preferences,
and adverse possession law was a perfect example of this failure to
maintain a focus on objective standards. Indeed, Helmholz appears to
grow more and more sympathetic to the tendency of judges to integrate ethical norms into decision-making, whether they overtly stress
the ethical foundations of private law principles from the outset or use
ethical norms to reinterpret and apply facially neutral principles.378
Helmholz admits that academic writers like himself, who enjoy “theoretical analysis of legal principles,” might find this movement toward
moral decision-making to be “unsettling,” but then he advises fellow
academics to become more sympathetic to “judges and juries[’]” desire “to do right,” at least in describing the law.379
V.

CONCLUSION

In tracing the evolution of adverse possession discourse in the legal
academy from 1881 to the middle of the 1980s, this Article has revealed at least five consistent themes. First, from the early conversations between Holmes, Pollock, and Maitland and the aphoristic
debate between Langdell and Ames, through the learned explorations
of English and American case law carried on by Ballantine, Bordwell,
and Walsh, and finally, as displayed in the sharp debate between
Helmholz and Cunningham, American property scholars (and occasionally their English interlocutors) consistently argued about the fundamental structure of the doctrine. Most of the scholars whose work is
analyzed in this Article were deeply concerned with whether adverse
possession should be understood primarily as a statute of limitations
designed to cut off ejectment claims of negligent owners or as a positive method for a possessor to acquire a new title. Although there
were some exceptions (most notably the legal realist inspired commentary of Charles Callahan and perhaps to a lesser extent Lon Fuller
and William Stoebuck’s state-specific studies), the scholars that are
the subject of this Article argued incessantly about this fundamental
question, seeing it as a crucial battle ground for adverse possession
scholarship. However, in more recent decades, this question increasingly receded to the background and came to be seen as purely academic (for reasons that will be explored in the sequel to this Article.)
376. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 102.
377. Id. (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters with O.W. Holmes, Jr., 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1828, 1830 (1983)).
378. Helmholz, Response, supra note 255, at 103.
379. Id. at 103–04.
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A second theme is the regular, but not quite as constant, engagement with identifying the social, economic, and systemic purposes of
adverse possession. Does adverse possession primarily serve to cut off
stale claims and quiet titles? Does it punish neglectful owners? Does it
reward active, agenda-setting possessors who develop land they possess and put it to socially beneficial purposes? Does it honor and accommodate the psychological connection between a person and the
object of his possession in a way that preserves social peace and prevents potentially dangerous resorts to self-help? In the decades that
followed the Helmholz-Cunningham debate, these questions assumed
center stage in adverse possession discourse, as it took an increasingly
theoretical turn in the wake of law and economics scholarship as well
as other theoretical innovations.380 But, during the long century of
scholarship this Article has reviewed, these inquires frequently bubbled to the surface—first in the early conversations between Holmes,
Pollock, and Maitland, somewhat less often in the interwar period,
and then with more intensity in William Stoebuck and Charles Callahan’s musings about adverse possession.
A third theme, which was clearly most present during the interwar
period dominated by the scholarship of Ballantine, Bordwell, and
Walsh, but which also appeared in other scholars’ work, is the nationalization of adverse possession law by American law professors. Almost all of the scholars conceded that the American institution of
adverse possession had its roots in English common law (and hardly
any acknowledged its roots in Continental Civil Law). But, many of
the scholars noticed that in the evolution of the rules of adverse possession, there was a perfect illustration of the tendency of American
law to distance itself from its English roots and to adapt English law to
the needs of a new democratic republic with vast amounts of relatively
undeveloped land and different social, political, and economic structures than England. This tendency to celebrate the Americanization of
adverse possession law reached its apotheosis in the work of Percy
Bordwell, who looked forward to the day when American adverse
possession law would fulfill its “destiny as a true prescription,”381 and
in the scholarship of William Walsh, which laid the foundation for the
mid-century objective approach toward adverse possession cemented
in the American Law of Property. After the Helmholz-Cunningham
debate, this concern about the national identity of adverse possession
380. See generally Merrill, supra note 22 (introducing a law and economics and
transactions costs perspective to adverse possession scholarship); Radin, supra note
29 (introducing Hegelian personality theory); Sprankling, supra note 51 (subjecting
adverse possession doctrine to an environmentalist critique); Stake, supra note 29
(questioning many rationales and emphasizing importance of endowment effect and
loss aversion theories drawn from modern psychology); Fennell, supra note 137 (using
sophisticated efficiency analysis).
381. Bordwell, Disseisin, supra note 116, at 9.
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as an institution would largely disappear as scholars became more interested in free-floating, universal property theory.
A fourth theme is the constant, and finally unresolved, debate over
the role of a possessor’s subjective intent in adverse possession law.
Should courts privilege good faith possessors, possessing under color
of title, or bad faith possessors, as some courts did in mistaken boundary cases? Or should courts adopt a pure possession or objective approach? Scholars throughout the century debated this fundamental
question. Unlike some of the other themes, this question continued to
fascinate, and sometimes divide, scholars in the next several
decades.382
A final theme that emerges from the vantage point of today is the
degree to which most of the adverse possession scholarship during this
long century was endogenous; that is to say, the property scholars
were engaged in a debate with themselves in a largely self-referential
manner. At times, their debates were primarily descriptive in nature.
Other times, and less frequently, their debates were prescriptive. But,
the material and phenomenon that formed the subject of their debates
were their own writings and, of course, the work of state court appellate judges deciding adverse possession cases. It is primarily in the curious, elliptical reflections of Charles Callahan (and to a lesser extent
in Henry Ballantine’s work and perhaps in Holmes), that we find an
adverse possession scholar who seems particularly interested in trying
to reconcile what was happening in adverse possession case law and
scholarship with social, economic, and technological phenomena
outside of that body of law. In the scholarship that came after the
Helmholz-Cunningham debate, however, American adverse possession law became more much concerned with exogenous forces and
often attempted to visualize how adverse possession law fit into
broader social, environmental, and political phenomena. Scholarship
also began to speculate about how adverse possession could be modified to achieve a variety of desirable social or economic ends.383
Although a full discussion of the achievements and limitations of
the last three decades of American adverse possession scholarship
must await another day, our understanding of that work will hopefully
have been deepened and sharpened by the analysis of adverse possession discourse of the preceding 100 years undertaken in this Article.
382. Compare Merrill, supra note 22 (arguing that adverse possession doctrine
should be modified to privilege good faith possessors), with Fennell, supra note 137
(suggesting adverse possession should only reward intentional bad faith possessors).
383. See, e.g., Sprankling, supra note 51 (linking adverse possession to the destruction of wild lands); Stake, supra note 29 (addressing adverse possession in the context
of other title clearing tools and risk aversion theory); Sally Brown Richardson, Abandonment and Adverse Possession, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1385 (2015) (arguing that adverse
possession should be modified to address the problem of vacant and abandoned structures in American cities).
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